

RELIGION *and the* STRUGGLE *for* EUROPEAN UNION

CONFESSIONAL CULTURE *and the* LIMITS *of* INTEGRATION

BRENT F. NELSEN AND JAMES L. GUTH

Religion and the Struggle for European Union

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Confessional Culture and the Limits of Integration

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Political Groups

The European Union's member state behavior and elite attitudes, as we saw in the last chapter, demonstrate the continued influence of confessional culture in contemporary Europe. Other social and economic factors also exert pressure on national decision makers, resulting in a sometimes-less-than-perfect match between confessional culture and member state behavior. But the general postwar pattern still holds: Elites in Catholic countries support deeper integration, while those in Protestant countries resist yielding sovereignty, preferring intergovernmental cooperation over supranationalism.

In this chapter we extend our exploration of European integration since 1975 to political groups, in particular churches and political parties. If confessional culture continues to divide the European Union, the Catholic Church and its associated political organizations should remain staunch supporters of integration and Protestant churches should show relatively less enthusiasm—or even outright hostility. Likewise, political parties with a strong Catholic influence should support integration, while parties based in Protestant-majority countries or sectarian parties should be Euroskeptics. As we will see, the general pattern holds—but with a new wrinkle or two.

The Catholic Church

The religious revival after World War II delayed but did not reverse the waning of the Catholic Church's influence over government leaders and decline in religious observance among ordinary Europeans. Indeed, starting in the mid-1960s, these developments accelerated. The Church had lost its official status throughout much of Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Germany and Malta excepted), but it remained privileged in several Catholic-majority countries, including Ireland and Poland. In the Age of Democracy, the Church found the focus of its European dialogue shifting from "church–state" to "church–society"; it no longer attempted to shape a confessional state, but rather a confessing society.[1] As John Paul II put it in *Ecclesia in Europe*: "In her relations with public authorities the Church is not

calling for a return to the confessional state" but instead offers "the engagement of believing communities committed to bring about the humanization of society on the basis of the Gospel, lived under the sign of hope."[2] Thus, as the twentieth century wore on, the Church put less emphasis on mobilizing Catholics behind favored political parties and more on persuading leaders and citizens to back its policy positions. In short, the Catholic Church transformed itself into a transnational interest group that could operate on both the international and domestic levels.[3]

Vatican II

The foundation for this new role of the Church was laid, of course, during the deliberations of the Second Ecumenical Council of the Vatican (commonly known as Vatican II). Pope John XXIII initiated the process of reform and set the tone by telling the council's first session in October 1962 that the church must "[bring] herself up to date."[4] The council responded with decisions that left the core doctrines of Catholicism unchanged but effectively revolutionized the Church's approach to the modern world. First, the council aimed for greater cultural relevance by opening the liturgy to the laity through the use of vernacular languages, increased lay participation, and the incorporation of indigenous cultural expressions into the Mass. Second, the council effectively ended the Church's monopoly on earthly salvation by welcoming dialogue with other Christian traditions—or, as Pope John called them, "the brethren who are separated"[5]—and with other Abrahamic faiths, namely Judaism and Islam.[6] The Church made explicit its intention to work for the unity of Christian people everywhere, ending whatever remained of the Counter-Reformation. Third, the council acknowledged the benefit of bishops working together in national or regional councils and allowed such gatherings as long as they were conducted in cooperation with the pope. In effect this action recognized the importance of national contexts to the life and governance of the Church—a development bound to erode the authority of the pope if carried through. Finally, the council acknowledged the impact of "personalism" by placing new emphasis on the dignity of the human person and by committing the church to defend the rights and freedoms of human beings of every faith or no faith.[7] In sum, Vatican II constituted a peace treaty between the Catholic Church and modernity. Gone was the closed, angry Catholicism of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; in its place was an open, more accommodating Catholicism, determined—as far as God would allow—to shape the modern world in its own image.

For the Church, coming to terms with modernity meant a withdrawal from direct political responsibility. Vatican II ratified the modern separation of church and state when it declared: "Christ, to be sure, gave His Church no proper mission in the political, economic, or social order. The purpose which He set before her is a

religious one."[8] To underline this position, the European bishops explicitly rejected any notion of a "confessional Christian state."[9] Thus, after Vatican II, "the Church no longer claimed to have a privileged place in politics or in state authority."[10]

The Church's withdrawal from a direct political role, however, did not mean its withdrawal from politics entirely. Public policy pronouncements and organized efforts to influence decision makers were still consistent with the Church's evangelistic, prophetic, and moral mission. But such activities would take place through normal methods of participatory politics rather than through backdoor diplomatic channels. Because the Church still carried significant weight with many Europeans, it remained fairly effective, although its political clout diminished as the twentieth century wore on. The Church's mobilization efforts, of course, still varied across Catholic Europe. In southern Europe—including Portugal, Spain, and particularly Italy—the Church remained a key mobilizer of support for Catholic-oriented political parties. But with John XXIII's election to the papacy in 1958, the tone changed. John (and his five successors) refrained from personal involvement in Italian politics. That was less true for the Italian bishops, who remained active supporters of the Christian Democratic Party until the party's demise in the early 1990s. Throughout the 1980s they continued to call for the "unity of Catholics," signaling "Church support for the [Christian Democratic Party]."[11] Nevertheless, they changed their tone after Vatican II, relying less on authoritative pronouncements and more on "rational persuasion." In the more secular northern and mixed countries of Germany and the Netherlands—but also in Belgium, Luxembourg, and France—the Church's role was even more muted, as the bishops stepped back from supporting the Christian Democratic parties, preferring to speak more directly about specific public policy issues.[12]

Vatican II changed the political role of the Catholic Church, but it did not reduce the Church's support for a more peaceful international community through cooperation and integration. Although the council did not endorse Pope John's explicit call for world government in his 1963 encyclical, *Pacem in Terris*, the bishops threw their weight behind regional organizations as the precursors to "a community of all men": "Already existing international and regional organizations are certainly well-deserving of the human race.[13] These are the first efforts at laying the foundations on an international level for a community of all men to work for the solution to the serious problems of our times, to encourage progress everywhere, and to obviate wars of whatever kind."[14]

The council's official words, however, were only the tip of the iceberg. Behind the scenes, the Vatican was developing a long-term approach to the European Community as it was evolving in the early 1960s. Rome's position was outlined in a public letter written by the papal secretary of state, Amleto Cardinal Cicognani, and sent on behalf of Pope John to the Forty-Ninth Annual French Social Week in July 1962.[15] The letter developed four great themes that were entirely consistent with

past Catholic approaches to Europe, but were also suited to the Church's new role as a moral voice in the modern world. First, the Vatican affirmed the existence of a common European "interest"—which would perhaps be better termed a common European culture or sense of community—that served as the foundation for European unity:[16] "Beyond any doubt, this European common interest exists; it must be affirmed and an effort must be made to bring about its realization." This "common interest" runs deeper than economic, social, and political interests. Its essence "expresses itself in common ways of thinking, feeling, and living," which "draw their unifying force" from "the European spirit," a set of "common spiritual values."

The second major theme is that Catholic Christianity, with its emphasis on the "human person," is the most important source of this "European spirit": "Above all, what has shaped the European soul for 2,000 years is Christianity, which has outlined the traits of the human person, a free being, independent and responsible." For the Vatican, a commitment to the freedom and dignity of the human person stood at the heart of European culture. Christianity taught Europe to value human beings and defend their rights before the state; thus, to ignore or minimize the role of Christianity in the creation of the European Community would be to cut the regional organization off from its cultural roots and deprive it of nourishment—without Christianity, a united Europe would never survive.

The letter's third theme is the importance of families for the success of the European Community. Europe, the letter argues, will not be built by governments alone; "intermediate bodies"—organizations that stand between the state and the individual—will need to assist with the creation of a common European community by bonding with each other in joint areas of responsibility. The trade unions must be involved, but the letter places special emphasis on the "primary and irreplaceable role of the family" in the building of Europe. European officials must implement policies designed to meet the needs of families, for "it is quite clear that they form the vital center of the Europe of persons and peoples and that they cannot be sacrificed for the organization of the European countries." Finally, the letter calls Catholics to participate actively in the building of Europe: "Catholics must be in the first rank in this eminently pacific undertaking."

Thus the Vatican of Pope John XXIII renewed its support for the fledgling European Community, but it also staked out a clear approach to contemporary European integration. For the sake of humanity, Europe must be built. The basis for European unity would be its common culture, not the Continent's material self-interest. Furthermore, Europeans would need to recognize that their culture, especially their extraordinary emphasis on the importance of the human person, was deeply indebted to Christianity as the main fountain of their common values. European public policy would focus on strengthening families as the building blocks of the new Europe. And the European Catholics would work with their hearts and hands to build a united Continent.

These themes, all with their roots in earlier Catholic teaching, constituted a general Catholic strategy toward the European Community, but not a blueprint for integration. As under Pius XII, the Church gave its general approval to federalist efforts, but it studiously avoided pronouncing on specific integration proposals. It would speak directly to public policies emerging from Brussels in areas such as human cloning and stem cell research, as it would to policies coming from member state governments, but it would not advise European leaders on how to integrate the Continent beyond continued reminders on the value of greater unity.[17]

The Roman Church would have plenty of opportunities to articulate its vision for Europe, beginning in the 1980s, as the European Community relaunched its integration efforts and incorporated new members. The bishops would play a key role in voicing the views of the Church, but the primary responsibility fell to a charismatic Pole who took a deep interest in European politics—Pope John Paul II.

The Papacy of John Paul II

John Paul II, elected in October 1978, understood very well his role as missionary, prophet, and pastor to Europe.[18] He grasped quickly the constraints on the modern Church, but he also understood the tremendous impact it could have with wise deployment of its "soft power" resources. The pope brought the Church to the world by traveling personally to its far corners. He skillfully used his charismatic personality, youthful vigor, and rhetorical skill in many languages to attract global media attention. Very soon he had achieved "rock star" status (augmented by his close scrape with death at the hands of a would-be assassin in May 1981) and a platform for his often-pointed messages to the peoples of the world and their leaders.

The pope's message to Europe differed little from that of his predecessors. Coming from this pope, however, it carried more weight because of the historical circumstances of late-twentieth-century Europe, his perspicacity, and his particular history. The Church in his care would not waver in its commitment to European unity, and he would personally promote integration with the tools of his office. His support for integration efforts was unmistakable. For example, in October 1988 in Strasbourg, he responded to President François Mitterrand's welcome by saying that the Catholic Church "can but greet with satisfaction the efforts made by the European countries to tighten still more their bonds and forge a common future."[19] And in his address to the European Parliament a few days later, he emphatically stated, "Since the end of World War II, the Holy See has not ceased to encourage the construction of Europe."[20] He did not confine himself to general statements of support for unity, however. Without entering into detailed policy discussions, he nevertheless spoke approvingly of the Single European Act by name, predicting that it would "hasten the process of European integration."[21] Thus he fearlessly supported a uniting Europe. For him, European integration was a passion, not a mere duty.

The pope's passion for integration was a natural extension of his belief in the deep spiritual unity of Europe, which transcended the Continent's divisions, and even its secularism. His 1979 trip to his native Poland offered clear, early evidence that he would emphasize European unity in both word and deed. This unity, however, would not be that of the Six or the Nine (the Six, plus Britain, Denmark, and Ireland); it would be unity of the entire divided Continent. "East" and "West," as Cold War concepts, had to disappear. Europe must, as he put it, "breathe with both lungs."[22] And Christianity was the only force that could bring both parts of Europe together. The pope told the Polish bishops gathered at Częstochowa that "despite the different traditions that exist in the territory of Europe between its Eastern part and its Western part, there lies in each of them the same Christianity, which takes its origins from the same Christ, which accepts the same Word of God, which is linked with the same twelve apostles."[23] Christianity was what made Europe "Europe." And the Church's role, especially in communist Europe, was to "commit itself anew to the formation of the spiritual unity of Europe."[24] The challenge to communism was obvious: The Iron Curtain was illegitimate and immoral; Europe was whole from "the Atlantic to the Urals." But once the Berlin Wall came down, the challenge to the whole of Europe was also obvious: Europe's unity was found not in its search for peace or material wealth, but in its common culture—in Christianity, as the source of its values and historical mission.

Throughout his pontificate, but more urgently after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Pope John Paul II labored to reteach Europe its vocation, reminding the Continent that its roots were in Christianity. Like so many Catholic leaders before him, he identified Christianity as the creator of Europe. Christianity gave Europe its form; and only in Christianity could Europe find its essential unity. In his June 28, 2003, encyclical, *Ecclesia in Europa*, the pope powerfully articulated his case:

> The history of the European continent has been distinctively marked by the life-giving influence of the Gospel. . . . There can be no doubt that the Christian faith belongs, in a radical and decisive way, to the foundations of European culture. Christianity in fact has shaped Europe, impressing upon it certain basic values. Modern Europe itself, which has given the democratic ideal and human rights to the world, draws its values from its Christian heritage. More than a geographical area, Europe can be described as "a *primarily cultural and historical concept*, which denotes a reality born as a continent thanks also to the unifying force of Christianity, which has been capable of integrating peoples and cultures among themselves, and which is intimately linked to the whole of European culture."[25]

John Paul insisted that Christianity—as a matter of historical record and moral necessity—was the key source of what defined Europe. He was more than willing to acknowledge other contributions, "from the spirit of Greece to that of Roman law

and virtue; from the contributions of the Latin, Celtic, Germanic, Slav, and Finno-Ugric peoples, to those of the Jewish culture and the Islamic world."[26] But no one could doubt that in his view there would be no Europe without Christianity.

Christianity was Europe's life-giving fountain, but a united Europe's "true identity" was in its values. These were the values of the Christian Democratic personalists: "the transcendent dignity of the human person, the value of reason, freedom, democracy, the constitutional state and the distinction between political life and religion."[27] All the peoples who shared Europe's heritage and affirmed its values should, he claimed, be welcome in a united Europe, where their "historical and cultural distinctions" and "national identities" would be valued, especially if the principles of subsidiarity and solidarity were properly developed and implemented.[28]

Finally, the pope urged Europe's leaders to draw on the assistance of the "one and universal" Church as they built a new "European home." The Church was first of all a model of unity, the visible embodiment of "unity in a diversity of cultural expressions" and an institution to be emulated.[29] Second, the Church and other religious bodies that stand apart from the state should be consulted as privileged voices on "authentic ethical and civil values."[30] Third, individual Christians should fill "the various European agencies and institutions, in order to contribute . . . to the shaping of a European social order which is increasingly respectful of every man and woman, and thus in accordance with the common good."[31]

Pope John Paul II longed for Europe to recognize its spiritual unity and recommit to its Christian roots. "*Europe*," he pleaded, "as you stand at the beginning of the third millennium, '*Open the doors to Christ! Be yourself. Rediscover your origins. Relive your roots*'" (emphasis in the original).[32] But was Europe listening? The writing of a Constitution for Europe was the perfect opportunity to accept the pope's argument and acknowledge the contribution of Christianity to the values and culture of Europe. An early draft of the Constitution's preamble mentioned the inspiration of the "cultural, religious, and humanist inheritance of Europe" but identified its sources as "the civilisations of Greece and Rome," the "spiritual impulse always present in its heritage," and the "philosophical currents of the Enlightenment."[33] With Christianity left out of the preamble, Pope John Paul II began a campaign to convince the European Convention to revise the draft. He made public pronouncements, called for a "reference to the religious and in particular the Christian heritage of Europe," and spent an hour in private conversation making his case to Convention chairman Valéry Giscard d'Estaing.[34] The European bishops followed his lead, as did several European governments—but all to no avail. The Convention redrafted the preamble, but it remained religiously generic, referring only to "the cultural, religious, and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality, and the rule of law."[35] The pope lived long enough to see the new draft, but he died before the treaty embodying the Constitution ran up against the intransigent French and Dutch electorates.

The failure to modify the proposed European Constitution's preamble only underlined the growing frustration that John Paul felt as the new millennium dawned.[36] The flush of excitement at the fall of communism and the reintegration of East and West faded quickly. The East seemed far more enamored with the secular, materialistic West than the West was with the spiritual, long-suffering East. The pope never doubted the necessity of a united Europe, but he began to realize that Europe could unite, and metaphorically thus gain the whole world, but still lose its soul. As the pope once exclaimed in anger, the European project looked more and more like an "ultra-liberal, consumerist system that is devoid of values."[37] Catholicism, for the first time, felt ambivalent. On one hand the Church, with a single voice, had supported postwar efforts to build a united Europe on principle. Beneath the divisions, Mother Church united Europe spiritually and morally. On the other hand, Europe had increasingly pursued unity for its material benefits alone, rejecting the spiritual unity of all European peoples and the gentle moral guidance of the Church in favor of a soulless consumerism and a decadent individualistic ethos. The Church had always sought to define the idea of "Europe" and the values that it would espouse.[38] But now those values were under attack, as was demonstrated by the constitutional debate and—just as shocking—the European Parliament's 2002 passage of a nonbinding resolution calling on current and prospective EU members (including Ireland and Poland) to guarantee legal abortions, sex education in public schools, and the universal availability of contraceptives. Such actions showing obvious disregard for Catholic contributions and moral sensibilities encouraged some Catholics to begin questioning not the principle of European unity but the character of the uniting Europe. And nowhere was this growing division within the Church more evident than in Pope John Paul II's native Poland.

Euroskeptical Catholicism in Poland and Ireland

Poland is a Catholic country with a Reformed sense of "chosen-ness." From the time of King Mieszko I's conversion to Christianity in 966, Poland has viewed itself as the easternmost bastion of Western Christian civilization. Pagan barbarians, Orthodox Slavs, and Muslim Turks lurked beyond its eastern borders, eager to conquer the nation and invade the West. Poland, however, had successfully held the line for Latin Christendom, fighting off the Protestant Swedes and the Muslim Turks in the seventeenth century to save Catholic Europe. The Poles took their mission to guard the eastern gate seriously, and consequently they saturated their public life with symbols of their sacred nation. By the early nineteenth century Poles saw their politically partitioned but spiritually united nation in messianic terms: Suffering Poland was Christ to the world—and thus a crucified Poland would become an instrument of divine renewal. As the romantic poet Count Zygmunt Krasinski wrote in 1847: "The real reason for the existence of Poland is to realize on Earth the Kingdom of Heaven."[39]

In the eyes of the Catholic Poles, God had chosen the Polish nation to perform special tasks in support of the universal mission of the Church. In the late twentieth century Pope John Paul II defined this "great apostolic assignment" as the "new evangelization" of an integrating Europe.[40] Speaking to the Polish bishops in Krakow in 1997, John Paul outlined this mission: "Today we cannot refrain from following the path we have been shown. The Church in Poland can offer Europe, as it grows in unity, her attachment to the faith, her tradition inspired by religious devotion, the pastoral efforts of her Bishops and priests, and certainly many other values on the basis of which Europe can become a reality endowed not only with high economic standards but also with a profound spiritual life."[41]

Poland's return to its home in the West was an opportunity for the Church to reawaken Europe's sleepy spirit and reinvigorate its common Christian values. John Paul II's Poland had the potential to transform the European Union with its example of an authentic Christian society. For this reason, the pope never wavered in his support for Polish accession to the EU; he was "perfectly happy to have Poland rejoin Europe, so long as that meant that Europe would in time become more like Poland, rather than the other way around."[42]

Many Polish Catholics, however, doubted that Poland could transform the EU before the EU—or more appropriately, the West—transformed Poland. In the early postcommunist era, several prominent Polish bishops—including Primate Josef Cardinal Glemp and Tadeusz Cardinal Pieronek—expressed reservations about joining what Glemp called "the rich proprietors' club."[43] They were clearly concerned—with good reason—about cultural imperialism. As Pieronek put it in 1998: "I most fear that which is habitually called the Western culture and which is quite often a distortion of that culture. The popular name for this is *McDonaldization*" (emphasis in the original).[44] The bishops, however, had no real choice but to line up behind the pope and to support Poland's accession to the EU. Polls indicated that more than 80 percent of Polish Catholic priests accepted the hierarchy's position, but a small number vociferously opposed accession, and their resistance took on political significance.[45]

Catholic opposition to the EU centered early on Father Tadeusz Rydzyk, a Redemptorist, and Radio Maryja, the radio station he founded in 1991.[46] The station's religious programming attracted a traditional Catholic audience of elderly, less educated, and poor listeners from rural areas.[47] But Rydzyk's right-wing, nationalistic politics and his penchant for anti-Semitic conspiracy theories gained him broader attention and a political following. His diatribes against the secular West, with its decadent values and liberal economics, touched that deep, conflicted current in the Polish Catholic soul, which the pope and bishops worked out in favor of the West and EU membership, but which the less cosmopolitan clergy and laity resolved in favor of a defense of traditional Polish identity. For Radio Maryja's listeners the EU threatened to undermine the religious unity of Poland, the moral foundations of

the family, and the economic supports of rural Polish life.[48] Joining this "Europe" did not sound like the fulfillment of a heavenly vision but the realization of a satanic nightmare. It would be better to hang on to what was left of Catholic Poland than to see it swallowed by a soulless empire.

Similar but less extreme currents could also be found in the Republic of Ireland, where Catholicism and national identity are closely intertwined. At first the Irish Catholics found little to object to in a unifying Europe.[49] They had sought converts or employment across Europe for centuries, and were eager for greater economic opportunities. Their Euro-enthusiasm was genuine, with none of the Protestant hand-wringing so prevalent across the Irish Sea. And they were willing to tie their faith to the European project. For Fine Gael prime minister John Bruton (1994–97), "the building of a united Europe is God's work in politics."[50]

Signs of trouble emerged, however, when the Irish electorate considered the constitutional changes that would be needed to implement the Nice Treaty in June 2001. The referendum had the support of the political establishment and the Catholic Church's hierarchy, but voters rejected the treaty 54 to 46 percent. Several factors accounted for the treaty's defeat, but conservative Catholics made up one group voicing discontent.[51] David Quinn of the *Irish Catholic*, for instance, asserted that growing numbers of Irish Catholics were "concerned the EU is moving in an increasingly anti-Christian—indeed, antireligious—direction.[52] Quinn cited European parliamentary pressures on religious organizations to accept women clergy as one reason for concern, but it was perceived European demands that Ireland change its restrictive abortion laws that greatly exercised Quinn and an increasingly skeptical Catholic minority. Two bishops, Philip Boyce and Thomas Finnegan, argued during the campaign that the EU's Charter of Fundamental Rights might be used to undermine Ireland's constitutional ban on abortion. But it was the pop singer and pro-life Catholic member of the European Parliament Dana Rosemary Scallon, a Fine Gael member, who became the public face of opposition to a secularizing EU. Her strong anti-Nice stand during the referendum campaign caused her expulsion from the European People's Party in the European Parliament.[53] But despite the efforts of antitreaty activists, the Nice Treaty was approved in a second vote in October 2002.

The abortion issue emerged again in 2008 and 2009, when the Irish (again) rejected, then (again) approved a treaty—the Lisbon Treaty—in two referenda. The Catholic hierarchy now exhibited a more conflicted approach to Europe. Sean Cardinal Brady, the primate of all Ireland, spoke directly to the struggle of conscience among Catholics when he pointed out that the EU's decisions on the role of the family, abortion, and faith issues "have made it more difficult for committed Christians to maintain their *instinctive commitment to the European project*" (emphasis added).[54] In 2009 the Irish bishops stated that Catholics could vote either way in the second referendum on the Lisbon Treaty with a clear conscience. They warned, however, that "it remains our responsibility, as citizens of Ireland and as citizens of the European

Union, to promote vigorously the 'Gospel of life' as described by Pope John Paul II."[55] Thus, on one hand, the bishops declared their neutrality on Lisbon ratification; but on the other hand, they tied the issue of abortion to the EU.

This connection between the EU and a liberal position on abortion again pushed some Irish Catholics into the "no" camp. Catholic prolife opponents of the treaty believed that changes in the EU institutions made it more likely that Ireland's "constitutional defense of an unborn child's right to life could be overridden by a European court."[56] Irish sovereignty, in their view, protected Ireland's strict stand on abortion; additional treaty revisions were bound to erode national autonomy in social and cultural affairs. Prolife Catholics believed that subsequent events proved these fears well founded. Following the approval of the Lisbon Treaty by Irish voters, three women challenged Ireland's constitutional ban on abortion by filing suit against the Irish state, a case known as *A, B et C v. Ireland* (2010).[57] The case, however, was brought not to the European Court of Justice but to the European Court of Human Rights and was, thus, not technically a European Union issue. In the event, the Court decided in favor of Ireland, finding no right to abortion in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.[58]

Poland and Ireland are outliers in Europe. Their broad mix of religion and politics is uncharacteristic in the EU. But the Polish and Irish Catholic churches are losing political and social influence as secular European culture takes deeper root. In addition, clergy sex scandals and ecclesiastical cover-ups have further undermined the credibility of the Church. This is a bad omen for Catholics. If Roman Catholics cannot hold the center in Poland and Ireland, where can they prevail?

The Contemporary Church

Pope Emeritus Benedict XVI requires only a brief discussion because he did not take a discernibly different approach to Europe than his predecessor, supporting European unity while pointedly critiquing the moral character of European society.[59] As Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger (before April 2005), he had a close relationship with Pope John Paul II, and the two shared a critical but hopeful perspective on Europe. Cardinal Ratzinger articulated his views in a book published in Italian just before he was elected pope. The book, which came out in an English edition in 2007 under the title *Europe: Today and Tomorrow*, echoes the themes outlined by John Paul II. Europe is a single "cultural and historical concept" shaped profoundly by the Roman Empire and Christianity. Christianity is the key to understanding Europe's distinctly Western concept of human rights, the dignity of all human persons, and the separation of spiritual and temporal powers. Without Christianity, Europe could not be Europe.

Cardinal Ratzinger locates the source of Europe's crisis in Reformation schisms and the revolutionary era, when "God and his will ceased to be relevant in public life."[60] The loss of God and the deification of the state led to the disastrous wars of the twentieth century. But soon after the dust cleared, Europeans, according to

Ratzinger, "quickly realized that only a united Europe could have a say in history and in its own future."[61] A remarkable group of men, in his view, put aside thoughts of revenge or humiliation and built a peaceful Continent. He located the source of their success in the application of their Christian values. He stated: "These politicians drew their moral concept of the State, of peace and responsibility, from their Christian faith, a faith that had overcome the challenges of the Enlightenment and to a great extent had been purified in its confrontation with the distortion of the law and of morality caused by the [Nazi] Party."[62] But Europe did not follow their lead. Instead, secular Europe "is denying its religious and moral foundations. . . . Europe, precisely in this hour of its greatest success, seems to have become hollowed out, paralyzed in a certain sense by a crisis of its circulatory system, a crisis that endangers its life."[63] This hollowing out was leading to demographic decline, as Europeans turned away from traditional marriage and the family.[64] Yet despite his disappointment, Cardinal Ratzinger—now become Benedict XVI—remained supportive of unifying Europe and called on Christians to contribute to its construction. "The destiny of society," he said, "always depends on creative minorities. Believing Christians should think of themselves as one such creative minority and contribute to Europe's recovery of the best of its heritage and thus to the service of all mankind."[65]

What will Pope Francis do with regard to European integration? He is not likely to deviate from the position taken by John Paul II and Benedict XVI. Indeed, his early pronouncements support the European project, but he is unlikely to make European unity a priority. As a representative of the Global South, he is less Europe-centered in perspective and more ready to highlight the universality of the Church over the unity of Europe.

To summarize: The Catholic Church remains supportive of a European project that—if constructed on the proper (dare we say *sacred*) foundations of Christian inspiration, brotherly reconciliation, just law, human rights, and moral norms—will bring peace and justice to Europe and beyond. But is Europe being properly constructed? For many Church leaders and lay communicants alike, this question is becoming more and more disturbing. They believe in the idea of Europe—it permeates every fiber of their beings—but they are less certain they believe in *this* Europe. The new Europe has broken free of its moral moorings. And the Church is increasingly hard-pressed to support a Europe unwilling to acknowledge the sustainer of its soul. For the EU, this may be bad news. The loss of its core Catholic supporters could leave the EU without passionate, ideologically driven *militants* (in the French sense) willing to endure economic hardship for the hope of a united Europe.

The Protestant Churches

The Protestant churches of the North did not emerge as strong political actors in the postwar period. The official churches, which historically were more instruments of

the state than independent actors, drifted toward political and cultural irrelevance. The established Church of England remained vocal on many issues, such as wars in the Middle East, but its internal divisions over the role of women clergy and homosexual ordination and the collapse of Church attendance undercut its credibility as a political actor. The Nordic and German Lutheran churches—a variegated mix of state, national, and "people's" churches—all still enjoyed some form of state support for their personnel and for public service activities, but they had gained autonomy from the state in matters of theology and church leadership. The Nordic churches played an important social function, but they were no longer "threatening" enough for the state to demand organizational control. Thus the Protestant churches of Europe were indecisive political actors—too national to become an effective transnational force, and too bound up in state structures to become effective domestic pressure groups. Much of this weakness, of course, is explained by the secularization of European society that struck all Europe, especially after 1970, but hit the Protestant churches most severely.

The Protestant churches, like the Catholic Church, have begun to demonstrate some variations in their approach to European integration. Although Catholics' doubts about the EU still represent nuances rather than major divisions in an otherwise unified approach to European integration, the same cannot be said for the fragmented Protestant churches. A few important Protestant churches have welcomed integration efforts with some enthusiasm, thus seeming to call into question the importance of confessional culture in shaping church attitudes and actions. Yet conversely, other Protestant churches have taken an approach more consistent with the expectations posited in this volume and have vociferously opposed European integration. Why have they taken these divergent paths?

The answer can be found in two important divisions that opened in postwar Protestant churches: a liberal/conservative divide, and a leadership/lay divide. The first division had its roots in the struggle over theological liberalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which opened a doctrinal and cultural chasm within Protestantism. On one side stood those churches—most often the mainline, or established, Protestant bodies—that embraced new critical approaches to interpreting the Bible and more open theologies. On the other side were the conservative (often "free" or nonconformist) churches that rejected biblical criticism and consequent changes to traditional beliefs and practices. The second division, which had a clearer impact on the liberal, established churches, opened between the more educated and theologically liberal church leadership and the diminishing numbers of people in the pews, who were often more traditional in perspective. These divisions had implications for European integration: The liberal churches—represented by their clergy—tended to support integration, but with some resistance from lay members; but the conservative Protestant churches remained staunch in their opposition to integration. There were, of course, national variations.

Liberal Protestantism and the Ecumenical Turn

Some educated nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century European Protestants questioned the theological certainties of the past. For them, Enlightenment rationality, advances in science, and modern biblical scholarship raised questions about the core truths of Christianity. However, other Protestant leaders believed that the European churches were venturing too far from their theological roots and moved to counter the trend either by creating evangelical factions within state churches (as within the Church of England and the state Lutheran churches of Sweden and Norway) or by leading schisms that gave rise to new denominations (as occurred in the late nineteenth century in Scandinavia and the Netherlands). Other Protestant leaders took a more moderate approach and accepted many of the new religious ideas, but without embracing the most radical implications of historical criticism or modern theology.

What emerged in the early twentieth century was an establishment Protestantism less willing to employ biblical and theological arguments to reinforce narrow sectarian differences over beliefs and practices. In addition, as establishment or "mainline" (here we consciously use the North American term) Protestantism became less sure of the objective content of its faith, it became more willing to embrace the social implications of the Gospel teachings of Jesus of Nazareth, particularly those pertaining to world peace and relief for the poor. The result was an ecumenical turn from the traditional Protestant tendency to divide over theological and national differences in favor of unity in spirit and mission. These Protestants no longer attempted to set themselves apart as especially pure or chosen, but sought to make visible the unity in Christ they had once believed was invisible. The Swedish bishop Jonas Jonsson dramatically underlined this position in 1993 on the occasion of the four-hundredth anniversary of the consolidation of the Swedish Reformation when he said that "the Church of Sweden is an Evangelical church indissolubly united to the One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic Church. The continuity that we represent and cherish determines our ecumenical work, it gives openness and direction to it. That hidden unity in Christ which the Church possesses will be made visible. With the whole of God's congregation on Earth we should, in reconciled diversity, be tokens of that peace and unity which God has prepared for humankind."[66] For this mainline wing of the Protestant movement, the Reformation was over.

The Protestant ecumenical turn also developed an institutional dimension. Although joint Protestant efforts on several fronts began in the nineteenth century, the 1910 World Missionary Conference at Edinburgh marks the start of the institutionalized ecumenical movement. Several international conferences were held in the 1920s, and by the 1930s Protestant church leaders were ready to establish the World Council of Churches (WCC). World War II, however, delayed the WCC's creation until 1948, when Protestant leaders from around the world finally met in

Amsterdam.[67] Most of the established and mainline European Protestant churches joined the WCC, as did the Eastern Orthodox churches. Conspicuous by their absence were the conservative Protestant churches, which refused to join the WCC because it was too theologically liberal—or worse, a harbinger of the end times and a herald of the Antichrist—and the Catholic Church, which still preferred to think of itself as the one true Church.

The WCC was committed to *worldwide* reconciliation in religion and politics, but Cold War divisions soon threatened its global strategy. The WCC's leadership decided in the late 1940s not to endorse European unity for fear of alienating the churches in the Soviet Bloc. Neither Eastern nor Western church leaders wanted any part of a revived Christendom that was perceived by the world as concomitant with "Europe" or "the West." Ecumenical Protestants thus looked past Europe to the world; European unity was only desirable if united Europe was a step toward world peace.[68] But the Protestants also hesitated for another reason: They remained suspicious of the Catholics. To many Protestants, especially the Germans, European unity meant a "Europe of the Vatican, ruled by Christian Democrats and political leaders who took their orders from the Roman Catholic Church."[69]

The WCC's early resistance to endorsing European unity inspired some Protestant politicians and businessmen involved in early integration efforts to form a separate regional group in September 1950 called the Ecumenical Commission on European Cooperation (ECEC). This network of Protestant elites from continental Europe—but also prominently from Britain, Scandinavia, and the United States—linked together pro-Europe political leaders.[70] It did not, however, attempt to mobilize churches. As Leustean points out, "These leaders regarded churches as playing a prime role in the process of reconciliation and cooperation rather than as actors directly involved in the political mechanism of European integration."[71] The ECEC continued until 1974, but a second regional ecumenical group that emerged from the WCC proved more durable. In the 1950s Protestant church leaders from both West and East began talks aimed at achieving peaceful cooperation on a deeper level than that offered by the WCC. In 1964 these talks resulted in the formation of the Conference of European Churches (CEC), which developed into a large network of national ecumenical councils and member churches that eventually stretched from Iceland to Russia. Most of its member churches were also affiliated with the WCC, but several of the national councils included the Catholic Church as well.

The ecumenical turn within the mainline churches marked a new era in European Protestantism. The Protestants were now open to cooperation across denominational and national lines in areas of common interest, the most important being East–West relations and development assistance. The new ecumenism, however, did not unify Protestantism; many cross-denominational organizations emerged, often on a regional level. For most of these organizations, European unity was not an issue of fundamental importance. Many ecumenical groups were now quite in favor

of any political development that promised cooperation among nations, but that is about as far as things went. Some major figures in the movement—such as Willem Visser 't Hooft, the Dutch Protestant theologian and first secretary general of the WCC—were known European unity enthusiasts, but the Protestant churches, both individually and as a transnational movement, did not generally share that enthusiasm.

This ambiguous attitude toward European integration can be seen in the mainline churches of Britain. British Christians seemed to give the idea of unity early support. In 1944, for instance, the Peace Aims Group, chaired by Archbishop of Canterbury William Temple under the auspices of the WCC (which was then in formation), called for common social, political, and economic institutions for the Continent.[72] After the war British foreign secretary Ernest Bevin tried to recruit the British churches to promote a "spiritual union" of Western countries to resist Soviet communism. The result was an ecumenical conference held at Albert Hall in London in April 1948 that brought together Protestants and Catholics—along with politicians from both major parties—to call for a united Europe built on spiritual foundations. Subsequently, several British organizations with both Protestant and Catholic representation emerged to advance the European idea in the late 1940s and early 1950s. As Philip Coupland points out, however, "the pro-European lobby among Christians was as shallowly rooted as the European movement in British society generally."[73] Most of the groups wobbled and collapsed in the early 1950s, due to several factors. First, the British Catholics were overrepresented in most of the pro-Europe Christian organizations and provided much of the initial enthusiasm. Some of the groups, such as the British Group of the Union of Christian Democrats, focused on forging ties with Christian Democratic groups on the Continent—not a particularly popular alliance in Britain. Second, the groups failed to achieve political balance and largely tilted toward the political right. Christian socialists remained conspicuously aloof from the European movement, the exceptions being several prominent Catholic Labour leaders. Finally, the coup de grace was the government's perceived loss of interest in European integration in the 1950s. The result was that "just as the state turned its back on European integration until the late 1950s, so the churches ignored it until the 1960s."[74]

In the 1960s the British Protestant churches somewhat reluctantly entered the public discussion concerning British membership in the European Community. The archbishop of Canterbury, Michael Ramsey, strongly supported Britain's first application during debate in the House of Lords. But it was not until 1967 that the British Council of Churches (BCC)—which at that time did not include the Roman Catholic Church—offered a full statement on European integration generally and British membership specifically, titled "Christians and the Common Market," in which the BCC somewhat tepidly declared that "on balance" it favored entry into the European Community but declined "to pronounce a verdict for or against such entry."[75]

Hardly a ringing endorsement of British membership, the report nevertheless made a strong case for Christian involvement in the process of European integration. Decrying the "almost complete silence of the British Churches during the past twenty years concerning European unity"—a charge it also leveled at the WCC—the report argued that the churches should have a deep interest in European integration because they were partly responsible for the division of the Continent and the rise of idolatrous nationalism.[76] The churches should therefore embrace the opportunity to help reconcile the nations in Europe. As for the kind of community for which the churches should be looking, the report urged Europe to embrace peace, human rights, openness to the world, and democracy. Achieving these values, however, did not require political union. Europe was working quite well without creating a unitary or federal state: "Europe is not to be seen as a unitary State, or even as a federal State in the making," but rather a system of "sovereignty shared between the European institutions in Brussels and the national institutions of Member States."[77] As if to underline this point, the report seemed to assert that any movement toward increased federalism—such as direct election of the members of the European Parliament—was undesirable, even if it increased democratic accountability.[78] And though the authors argued that Europeans should break down barriers to cooperation, they strongly opposed the notion of a homogenized European identity: "However close relations between the partners in the Community may come to be, it is neither desirable nor intended that their identities should become entirely merged in an undifferentiated whole."[79]

The BCC's report, like the British government of the day, and the British electorate in general, viewed the European Community as a worthy project to which Britain could contribute and from which it could benefit, but there was little enthusiasm for joining the European endeavor. There was certainly no shining vision of a future united Europe. In light of the report, the BCC passed a rather weak endorsement of British membership: "The Council considers that British membership of a Community which . . . counts among its aims the reconciliation of European enmities, the responsible stewardship of European resources and the enrichment of Europe's contribution to the rest of mankind, is to be welcomed as an opportunity for Christians to work for the achievement of these ends."[80] Once Britain had joined the Community, the churches again went silent, preferring to let the CEC, their regional organization, speak on European issues.

A postwar ecumenical spirit permeated the network of European Protestant leaders, which led most mainline ecclesiastical elites in Britain (including the leaders of the Church of England, the Methodist Church, and the Church of Scotland[81]) to take a positive if lukewarm approach to integration. This spirit did not necessarily trickle down to the people in the pews. Many lay members of the mainline churches no longer attended regularly as the process of secularization picked up speed in Britain. Observant members often remained more traditionally Protestant

than their liberal leaders, and thus they took a more skeptical approach to Europe. The result was a definite, though muted, division between the cosmopolitan British church elites and their more traditional parishioners. And this same phenomenon appeared in the Scandinavian countries during their own membership debates.

Scandinavians have played a prominent role in the postwar ecumenical movement. One of the nine WCC assemblies held since 1948 convened in Uppsala (1968), and the Norwegian Olav Fykse Tveit served as secretary-general of the WCC beginning in 2009. On a regional level, six of the fourteen CEC assemblies have been held in Scandinavian countries. These activities have put Scandinavians in contact with Protestants elsewhere; but just as important have been the intense contacts between Lutherans and Catholics since Vatican II. According to Susan Sundback, the "improved relations between the Lutheran churches and Roman Catholicism on the national and local levels" proved crucial in developing pro-EU positions among Lutheran leaders in the run-up to the 1994 membership referenda in Finland, Norway, and Sweden.[82] Although the Nordic churches, speaking as institutions, did not "authoritatively, publicly, or unanimously declare themselves as being for or against the EU in 1994," many church leaders supported membership as consistent with the universality of Christianity.[83] Several prominent theologians, for instance, recommended "yes" votes, as did the Finnish archbishop and several Swedish bishops.[84] The churches as a whole, however, remained ambivalent. Antti Raunio observed that the Finnish Church's position on Europe was "critical, yet positive,"[85] whereas Hørgaard-Højen noted that Danish church leaders, more than the state or the people, were "terrified of losing [Danish] sovereignty and autonomy."[86] But though the top clergy almost unanimously, although in some cases reluctantly, endorsed Nordic membership in the EU, the people in the pews, few as they were, expressed far less support, especially in Norway. Moreover, the churches' support for EU membership seems to have had only a marginal impact on the referenda.

Not all the established churches' opinions were quite so positive toward integration in Europe. Ironically, many liberal Protestants inside the European Community, though supportive of integration, still harbored long-standing doubts about Catholic power. Liberal Protestants sharply criticized Pope John Paul II, for example, for his vocal plea to integrate Eastern with Western Europe and for his frequent calls to "reevangelize" the Continent. Several Reformed and Lutheran churches deliberately bypassed the CEC and met in Budapest in March 1992 to discuss ten "theses" that together constituted an alternative to the pope's call to reevangelize newly united Europe. The theses emphasized the pluralistic and secular nature of the Continent and the separation of the spiritual and political—all attributes of Europe that many Protestants attributed to the rise of Protestantism. Implicit in these theses was the assumption that the Catholic Church was seeking to reverse the secular wave crashing over Europe by reimposing its monopoly over European religion, politics, and society. To these Protestants, reevangelization looked like re-Vaticanization.[87]

The Protestant leaders explicitly rejected "the idea that Christianity should reconquer Europe."[88] But they did not completely reject European integration. As Pastor Michel Hoeffel, president of the Church of the Augsburg Confession in Alsace-Lorraine, put it in 1990: "There can be no question of reverting to a 'Christian Europe' where churches would wield some kind of power. The Church must place itself in the service of European society *as it gropes towards unity*" (emphasis added).[89] The Evangelical Church in Germany (Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland)—which brought together Lutheran, Reformed, and United churches in a single organization—seemed particularly ready to support the German state's European strategy. It had not always done so; in the early postwar period, the church had held "views on the Europe idea [that] bordered on the skeptical."[90] But in the mid-1990s the Evangelical Church took a decisive European turn and declared that the European peoples and nations "must be prepared to surrender part of their sovereignty and also their monopoly of power to supra-state bodies."[91] This unequivocally federalist position made the Germans the most pro-European of the Protestant churches.

Continental liberal Protestantism was too divided to speak with any weight in the European debate, and more important, as one German theologian noted, Protestantism did "not yet know what it should say to Europe."[92] Most of what Protestants did say was expressed through the CEC, which occasionally offered its views on developments in the EU. In May 2001, for instance, the CEC's Church and Society Commission issued a report of its Working Group on the European Integration Process—the first that included input from the whole of Europe, both East and West.[93] The report took a generally positive stance toward European integration but criticized its overemphasis on economics: "The churches support an integration of Europe which must not be confined to its political and economic aspects. Without common values, unity cannot endure." It called for a decision on the "ultimate goal of the current process of integration," but it declined to put forth its own vision of a "final aim." A new identity for the Continent was desirable but nevertheless must be "shaped as a mutual interplay between unity and diversity."[94]

The increased openness to integration demonstrated by this CEC report reflected a degree of harmonization of church positions across confessional cultures. In the 1990s and the early twenty-first century, the ecumenical Protestants and Vatican II Catholics found many occasions to cooperate. In 1990 the British Roman Catholics joined the BCC, and in 1999 the organization renamed itself Churches Together in Britain and Ireland. The Catholic Church still remained outside the WCC, but the CEC and the Catholic Church's Council of European Bishops' Conferences agreed in April 2001 to a set of guidelines for the deepening relationship between them, the Charta Oecumenica. The Charta included a statement favoring the integration process—which was directly echoed by the CEC report of the following month—but also mentioned several social issues that show the influence of Catholic thinking: "The churches support an integration of the European continent. Without common

values, unity cannot endure. We are convinced that the spiritual heritage of Christianity constitutes an empowering source of inspiration and enrichment for Europe. On the basis of our Christian faith, we work towards a humane, socially conscious Europe, in which human rights and the basic values of peace, justice, freedom, tolerance, participation, and solidarity prevail. We likewise insist on the reverence for life, the value of marriage and the family, the preferential option for the poor, the readiness to forgive, and in all things compassion."[95]

In sum, the Protestant establishment churches had softened their theological anti-Catholicism but continued to fear the centralizing and monopolizing tendencies of the Roman Church as it pursued its vision of a united Europe. Postwar theological reflections on Christian unity and new ecumenical efforts freed the Protestant leaders to think more positively about integration, but they were far from fervent European federalists. The British and Nordic Protestant leaders were generally positive toward integration, but they often found the issue peripheral to their interests, which were often more global than regional. Moreover, in Britain and the Nordic countries, the religious leaders were more pro-Europe than the people in the pews—and were certainly more supportive of integration than the vocal sectarian Protestants, who staunchly opposed the erosion of Protestant and national identities. "EU negativism," observed Sundback, "increased the further one went from the centre of the national churches."[96]

The Sectarian Protestants

Some Protestants in the Netherlands, Britain, and the Nordic countries never made the ecumenical turn. These conservative and evangelical denominations perceived the WCC as a club for theological liberals who had abandoned their commitment to the authority of the Scriptures and the fundamental tenets of the Christian faith. Some churches were not opposed to cooperation among Christians, but they were rather choosy about their partners. In addition to being theologically conservative, these churches often defended a religion-based national identity; for them, the Norwegians were Lutherans, the Dutch were Reformed, and the British were Anglicans. For these Protestants, eroding the beliefs and practices of the faith meant eroding the markers of national identity. Thus, for some churchgoing Protestants, the Reformation was not over; Catholicism was still the enemy of the true church.

The conservative Protestant churches in Europe after 1970 were small and politically inconsequential in increasingly secular societies. But their members were staunch believers and frequent church attenders. They were often not interested in commenting on public issues; nor were they frequently asked for their opinions by the political establishment or the press. In multiparty systems they usually made their voices heard through the small conservative Christian parties, such as the Christian Democratic parties of the Nordic countries; the Reformed Party, the Reformed

Political Alliance, and the Reformatory Political Federation (later combined in the Christian Union) in the Netherlands; and the Democratic Unionist Party in Northern Ireland. Their positions on European integration never carried much political weight.[97]

These old-style Protestants, however, continued in the tradition of Protestant skepticism toward continental integration.[98] Different churches highlighted different dangers; but taken together, conservative Protestants were concerned that integration would bring increased secularization, a loss of national identity, and greater Vatican influence. Some churches preached their anti-EU message with fire and brimstone. The Free Presbyterian Church of Northern Ireland railed against the Common Market as a scheme of the Antichrist during the British referendum debate in 1975, and it continued to accuse the EU of being a papal puppet well into the twenty-first century. In June 2000 Ian Paisley—then a member of the European Parliament, and former first minister of Northern Ireland—posted a summary of his perspective on the website of the European Institute of Protestant Studies. Speaking of the EU, he declared: "Knowing the Bible should make us realise that it is pure folly to want to join (via ecumenism) this final apostasy of Babylon which is Biblically and historically wrong. Rome is unchanging, unrepentant and arrogant without change. People are striving for unity with this beast as though it was something required as a necessity in this life and for the next. Such folly when our gracious Lord brought us out of such bondage in the sixteenth century. . . . What folly to return."[99]

Those associated with Paisley's brand of hard-line British Protestantism spoke of a Vatican conspiracy to create a "Roman Catholic European Superstate" as a first step to world domination. The fingerprints of the Vatican were all over the EU. They pointed to the twelve stars in the EU flag and saw a symbol of the Madonna; they note the repeated references to Charlemagne and saw a plan to recreate the Carolingian Empire; they observed a depiction of Europa riding on a bull (Zeus) on a postage stamp and saw the whore of the Book of Revelation; they saw an EU Common Foreign and Security Policy and expected a military takeover by the Vatican.[100] For these British Protestants, however, the central issue was identity. They saw themselves as a chosen people called by God to resist the forces of the coming Antichrist. For them, to join with the Catholics in building Europe would mean the end of their sacred mission and the loss of their identity as a separate people. And they refused to give in.

Other Protestant churches were less vivid in their anti-EU rhetoric, but they were just as opposed to integration. In the Netherlands conservative Reformed churches were concerned about the loss of national identity and the undue influence of Brussels. In the Nordic countries the conservative free churches and evangelical congregations were very skeptical about the nature of the EU. Some Nordic churches, like the Free Presbyterians in Northern Ireland, identified integrating Europe with the evil forces of the end times.[101] During the Maastricht Treaty debate in Denmark, for

instance, conservative Christians debated in the pages of *Idé Politik* whether or not the EU was the resurrected Roman Empire of biblical prophecy.[102] One Norwegian bishop grew so concerned by such rhetoric in the early 1990s that he warned "believers against indulging too much in demonising the EEC."[103] Conservative Nordic Protestants joined the anti-EU movements as nationalists defending their "non-Catholic and/or tribal type of collective religious identit[ies]."[104]

The conservative Protestants in Europe in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries remained uncompromising Euroskeptics. They saw the establishment Protestant leaders as sellouts to worldly religion and traitors to the nation. They remained the true believers in the sacred foundations of national identity. They continued to carry the flame of the Reformation, refusing to give up their distinctive religious or national beliefs. And all that put them at odds with the European Union, which still smelled of conspiracy and control.

Religious Groups and the European Union

If the general pattern has been for the Catholics and Catholic groups to favor European integration and for the Protestants to hesitate, we would expect religious representation in Brussels to favor the Catholic Church. That is in fact very much the case. Several Catholic organizations established offices in Brussels soon after the launch of the European Coal and Steel Community. A further jump in Catholic representation occurred after 1965 in response to the Merger Treaty (signed in 1965) and—more important—Vatican II and the Roman Church's new engagement with the broader world. Other Christian representations (including Protestants), conversely, got a very slow start in Brussels with few organizations appearing before the mid-1970s. Non-Catholic Christian organizations, though still lagging behind the Catholics, established offices at a more rapid clip after the Single European Act in the mid-1980s and caught up to the Catholics in the pace of new establishments in the early 2000s. The Catholic Church, however, "remains the dominant confession in terms of the number of religious representations" in Brussels.[105]

The Roman Church also seems to be more effective in its lobbying. Popes have special access to Europe's top leaders; since 1970 Brussels has hosted a permanent papal nuncio in charge of diplomatic relations between the Holy See and the EU; and the Commission of Bishops' Conferences of the European Community is one of the most important voices of civil society in Brussels. Furthermore, nearly forty major Catholic organizations carry on the day-to-day job of representing Catholic interests in the EU.[106] Protestants are represented by the CEC and the agents of individual churches, but that representation is uneven. Some Protestant churches, such as the Quakers and the Evangelical Church in Germany, have fairly visible representations. But the Church of England sent a representative to the European

institutions only in May 2008. Such a paltry presence prompted Mark Hill to ask, "Why does the Church of England seem to lack visibility in Europe?"[107] This same question could be asked of many Protestant churches.

The overall trend is for more religious representation in Brussels—of Christian faiths, non-Christian faiths, and "convictional" organizations. The European Union itself has encouraged this dramatic expansion. Commission president Jacques Delors had called on Europeans in early 1992 to "give a soul to Europe, to give it spirituality and meaning."[108] This led to a "structured" dialogue between the religious organizations then represented in Brussels (and many more that soon opened offices) and the Commission and other European institutions. Much of this dialogue took place through an office established by Delors called the Forward Studies Unit (later renamed the Group of Policy Advisers to the European Commission, and now called the Bureau of European Policy Advisers, with a much broader set of participants).[109] The EU further institutionalized the religious dialogue through Article 17 of the Lisbon Treaty, which expanded the official recognition of religious communities codified earlier in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty by inviting representative groups to join an "open, transparent, and regular dialogue" with the EU. The inclusion of Article 17 was seen by many as a sop to the Catholic Church and the Catholic member states, which had pressed hard for recognition of Christianity in the preamble to the Constitutional Treaty.[110] Secularist and humanist groups have strenuously opposed the article's special treatment of religious organizations—even though secular groups themselves participate in the dialogue as "convictional" bodies. In their view the disturbing influence of the Catholic Church best explains the anomalous Article 17.[111]

Official dialogue began under Delors in the late 1980s. He appointed a body of advisers called the "Lacroix Group" to facilitate contact with the churches. For Protestants working through the CEC, this was the first experience of official contact with the institutions of the EU.[112] In September 1990 Delors appointed Marc Luyckx to lead efforts to facilitate religious dialogue, and subsequent Commission presidents have followed suit with their own facilitators. The Bureau of European Policy Advisers' mandate goes far beyond dialogue with religious bodies, but that remains a key element of its mission.[113]

Is this dialogue important? Measuring the efficacy of a "dialogue" is very difficult. Certainly there is great benefit in bringing religious representatives together for structured discussions. But the dialogue seems to be hampered by several problems. First, the participants are carefully chosen and generally represent liberal religious positions. They are, in Jean-Paul Willaime's telling quip, the "European ecclesiocrats."[114] Few Christian fundamentalists or Islamists attract invitations. Meetings without hard-liners certainly go better, but the full range of religious perspectives, especially conservative viewpoints, is not represented. Second, the agendas are

limited. As one observer put it, the meetings seem "set on celebrating religions and showing deference to traditions, more than on instigating a dynamic which can then be carried over on the ground."[115] Third, while Delors provided focused leadership during the early years, such guidance has since been lacking. Without top-flight political leaders behind the dialogue, the meetings attract little media attention and thus have no public impact. Religious groups are much more effective when they are not engaging in official dialogue but are simply lobbying the EU like other Brussels interest groups.

Political Parties

Political parties have evolved in ways similar to the European churches since 1975. Mainstream parties with Catholic roots or large Catholic electoral bases have continued to support integration, usually with enthusiasm. Some Catholics, however, began to drift to new nationalist parties of the far right. Meanwhile, mainstream parties in Protestant countries developed a guarded openness to deeper forms of integration, while Protestant sectarian parties maintained their strong opposition.

The European People's Party

Mainstream parties of the left, right, and center in the Catholic or confessionally mixed EU member states have universally supported the integration process—even if they have differed on details.[116] The Social Democrats, Liberals, and Christian Democrats have backed the community method of integration through supranational institutions as a matter of ideological conviction.[117] Christian Democrats, however, have continued to be most comfortable with the special combination of creeping supranationalism, liberal economic policies, state regulation, and subsidiarity found in the developing EU. Ironically, the Christian Democratic political group in the supranational European Parliament has experienced a more significant confessional struggle than any other political group in the years since the first enlargement.

That division appeared as soon as Britain and Denmark joined the European Community. The Christian Democrats from the Six formed the European People's Party (EPP) in July 1976 to serve in large part as the European parliamentary wing of the European Christian Democratic Union (EUCD), the successor to the Nouvelles Équipes Internationales.[118] These leaders, however, were divided over exactly what the new party was to stand for. The traditional Christian Democrats, mainly from Italy and the Benelux countries, stressed fidelity to Catholic social teaching and its emphasis on social and economic justice. Other Christian Democrats, mainly from Germany, stressed markets and individualistic liberalism over Catholic social

teaching. Overlapping—and, in fact, reinforcing—this cleavage was a gap between Christian Democrats from Catholic parties and those from mixed confessional parties (again, primarily Germany). The former tended toward a purist approach to party ideology and drew dark lines between themselves and non–Christian Democratic movements. The latter tended to be more pragmatic, open to joining forces with other conservative parties across the Continent.[119] Tension between the two groups developed over naming the party, with the Catholic Christian Democrats insisting that "Christian Democratic" represented the nature of the party, while their pragmatic German counterparts pushed for a more inclusive label, such as "Democratic Center." At the same time, the two groups clashed over inclusion of the British and Danish Conservative parties (which were not members of the EUCD). The Christian Democratic faction argued that conservatism in these Protestant countries overemphasized individualism and markets while ignoring the social justice elements of Christian Democracy. The Germans, conversely, thought a party that included conservatives would be in a much better position to oppose a unified socialist movement in the European Parliament and elsewhere. A compromise was found with the adoption of the "European People's Party" (a name associated with Christian Democracy, especially in Italy), but no agreement was reached on admitting the conservative parties in Britain and Denmark. These parties remained outside the EPP in their own parliamentary formation, the European Democratic Group.[120] The issue, however, refused to die.

Christian Democrats from German-speaking countries continued to press for an alliance with conservative parties, and they eventually (October 1977) established a new group called the European Democratic Union that brought British and Nordic conservative parties together with a smattering of Christian Democrats. This incensed hard-line Christian Democrats; an alliance with conservative parties clearly opposed to Catholic social policy and European federation was out of the question. In their minds the EPP was designed as a federated party (of member state parties) to operate within the European Community as a harbinger of a new supranational politics. To traditional Christian Democrats the inclusion of Euroskeptical conservatives in a grand coalition of the right would weaken what the EPP's 1989 electoral manifesto called its "most important task": "the further development of the EC to a political union, to a socially responsible economic and monetary union and to a security union."[121] Thus many Christian Democrats initially saw the Bureau of European Policy Advisers as a rival to the EUCD and EPP and demanded that parties and individuals choose sides. Over time, however, emotions cooled and all three organizations found useful roles. All sides simply agreed not to discuss the issues that divided them.[122]

No further movement occurred until the early 1990s, when the end of the Cold War brought the issue of a general alliance of the right again to the fore. A complicated dance ensued as the conservative parties and pragmatic Christian Democrats

(led especially by the Belgian Wilfried Martins and German chancellor Helmut Kohl) worked to convince resistant ideologues that an alliance with the conservatives was essential if the EPP was to maintain influence as the EU expanded to areas without traditional Christian Democratic movements. Martins and the chairman of the British Conservative Party, Chris Patten (a Catholic who was ideally suited to the task of dealing with the continental Christian Democrats), conducted talks; but the breakthrough occurred when Margaret Thatcher left 10 Downing Street. British and Danish conservatives in the EP joined the EPP Group in May 1992 (the Spanish conservatives had joined earlier). EPP Group membership in the European Parliament, however, was not the same as party membership in the EPP, which was still denied to the center-right Anglo-Nordic parties. Discussion continued within the EPP regarding the membership of conservative parties and the antifederalist Christian parties of the Nordic region. At the Athens Congress in November 1992 the EPP decided to amend its statutes and to open itself to broader membership. Eventually, the conservative and Christian Democratic parties of Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and even Norway were granted some form of official status (the British Conservatives never officially joined).[123] The alliance clearly benefited the EPP, making it one of the two largest groupings in the European Parliament. But tension between the old-line—mostly Catholic—Christian Democrats and the mostly Protestant conservatives and Nordic Christian Democrats over the federal nature of Europe never disappeared. Although the Nordics and others learned to live and work with the tension, the British Conservatives never did.

For the Tories, membership in the ideologically federal EPP felt uncomfortable. Euroskeptical Conservatives put relentless pressure on the Tory leadership to withdraw from the EPP group in the European Parliament. The Euroskeptical Bruges Group, for instance, addressed the contradictory visions of Europe held by the British Tories and the EPP in a paper written in 1999: "How can a group with the desired objective of opposing a federal Europe and of stopping Britain being run by Europe be part of a larger group whose loudly expressed purpose is the creation of a United States of Europe? The two competing visions are impossible to reconcile."[124]

But the alliance with Christian Democrats gave the Tories influence in the European Parliament that they could never have gained alone, so the party leadership delayed action. In response to continued pressure, however, the Tories formed a group within the EPP called the European Democrats. But pressures continued, and in 2009 Conservative leader David Cameron made good on his pledge to withdraw from the EPP and form a new parliamentary bloc called the European Conservatives and Reformists Group. Joining the Tories were other Euroskeptical conservative parties from Poland (Law and Justice), the Czech Republic (Civic Democracy), Latvia (National Alliance), and the Dutch Protestant Christian Union. In the end, the cultural struggle within the EPP ended in divorce.

The Anglo-Nordic Parties

The political parties in the Protestant-majority countries of the North adjusted to their national situations, but most remained wary of significant moves toward a federal Europe. The Conservative Party in Britain removed Margaret Thatcher from leadership in part because of her intransigent Euroskepticism.[125] Since her departure, however, the Tories have moved inexorably in her direction. When in government, the party has dragged its feet on integration, but generally it has tried to behave responsibly as an EU member. The euro crisis, however, undermined some economic arguments for staying in the EU, making withdrawal a realistic option to many—perhaps most—Conservative Party members. At the other end of the political spectrum, the Labour Party under Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, and Ed Miliband looks Euro-enthusiastic only by comparison. Blair did sign the Constitutional Treaty, but then (after some arm twisting) promised a national referendum that most doubted could be won. The only truly European party in Britain is the small Liberal Democratic party, which was formed by a merger of the Social Democratic and Liberal parties in 1988. The Social Democrats had seceded from Labour in 1981, due in part to the party's lack of enthusiasm for Europe. Led by former Commission president Roy Jenkins, David Owen, Bill Rodgers, and Shirley Williams (a prominent British Catholic[126]), the Social Democrats failed to really break the mold of British politics, but they did raise the profile of the traditional third political force. The hung Parliament of 2010 accorded the Liberal Democrats unusual influence as the junior partner in a Tory-led government. But a dismal showing in the 2014 EP elections underlined the unpopularity of the party's pro-EU position. By contrast, Nigel Farage and the UK Independence Party bolted from the political margins to first place in the 2014 elections on an anti-EU platform. The Independence Party's victory does not guarantee British withdrawal from the EU, but certainly makes it conceivable.

Like the mainstream British parties, the major Nordic parties since 1975 have also been lukewarm in their enthusiasm for Europe. Most have understood that the small countries had limited options and thus were eager to cooperate with their southern neighbors. But the patterns were complex. The conservative parties in the Nordic countries have favored integration, primarily on economic and security grounds, while the Social Democratic parties have split between centrist advocates of intergovernmental integration and left-wing skeptics. The Protestant Christian Democratic parties in the Nordic countries, however, provide us with an interesting picture of Protestant perspectives there. As "moral protest parties" the Christian People's parties (now renamed "Christian Democratic" parties in every country except Norway) have consciously defended conservative religious values in the face of more liberal social trends that accelerated in the 1960s and 1970s. Their countercultural positions on alcohol consumption, abortion, pornography, same-sex

relationships, child rearing, religious education, and a host of related social issues have ensured their positions as small, but sometimes influential, ideological parties in multiparty systems. On the question of European integration, these parties have generally opposed cooperation with Europe; but their positions have evolved.[127]

The experience of the Nordic Christian Democrats parallels to some extent the clergy/laity divide observed in the established Protestant churches. Although elites have grown more favorable to integration, the party faithful have remained staunchly opposed. We saw earlier how the Norwegian Christian People's Party divided in the early 1970s over the issue of European Community membership, with the party rank and file voting overwhelmingly against joining over the wishes of several (but not all) party leaders. Over time, the elites fell in line, and now the Norwegian party is united in opposition to institutional ties to the EU. The issue also divided the Danish Christian Democrats. And though party leaders generally favored the arms-length Danish approach to membership, rank-and-file members cared little for integration. Intraparty conflict broke out in the early 1990s over the two Maastricht Treaty referenda, with the parliamentary group arguing for ratification and the Central Committee (representing the members) demanding that the party adhere to its 1986 Statement of Principles call to resist "the development of the EC towards a more extensive form of political-economic cooperation than is laid out in the EC Treaties."[128] The two sides patched up their differences, however, and the party united in opposition to euro zone membership in 2000.

The division between leaders and members was most dramatic in Sweden, where the Christian Democratic Party elites, under the robust leadership of Alf Svensson, strongly supported EU membership in 1994. Svensson argued that the EU had been "brought forth" by Christian Democratic pioneers and was supported by Christian Democratic parties that, in his view, were political "family." Party members were not so sure.[129] To many of the party's faithful, the continental Christian Democrats looked opportunistic, corrupt—and Catholic. One activist warned in a 1993 party congress that "Europe should not come under the papacy."[130] A majority of the Swedish Christian Democrats voted "no" in the 1994 accession referendum, and again in the 2003 referendum on adopting the euro. Finally, in Finland the Christian Democrats have been more unified. The party took a vigorously Euroskeptic stance, going so far as to withdraw from the Esko Aho coalition in 1994 to protest the preparations for membership. The party—even when in government—has continued to oppose EU membership and membership in the euro zone, despite Finland's official commitment to both.

In the Netherlands the mainstream Christian Democratic Appeal, with its Catholic contingent, has remained supportive of integration, but the smaller Reformed parties have taken more skeptical positions.[131] Two small orthodox Calvinist parties merged in 2001 to form the Christian Union (CU), which inched away from the hard-line anti-EU approach of its constituent parties to assume a mildly Euroskeptical

position. The CU declared its willingness to work within the EU, but continued to resist federalism and (like its Protestant Nordic political cousins) the social liberalism of mainstream Europe. To the right of the CU stands the tiny Reformed Political Party (Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij), which openly espouses a brand of Calvinist theocracy and consistently takes a hard-line anti-European position.

Finally, as we would expect, the confessional divide runs deeply through Northern Ireland. The Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), the primary party of Catholics, has consistently followed a strong pro-EU line.[132] The SDLP leader John Hume wrote in a 1992 newsletter that Northern Ireland was participating in a process of shared sovereignty "as we move inevitably towards the United States of Europe and . . . rid ourselves of the obsession with Britain and re-build our links with the rest of Europe." In his view, "the only union that matters is the European union."[133] Moreover, the party has favored a progressive approach to EU policy that reflects Catholic social policy: "The SDLP wants to see the EU continue as a frontrunner in advancing peace and sustainable social and economic development worldwide. We do not believe simply in a Europe of economies, but in a Europe of values and a Europe of influence—a real challenge to poverty, disease, and war."[134]

On the other side of the sectarian divide stand the unionist parties: the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and the late Ian Paisley's Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). Both Protestant parties have taken strong anti-European positions, but the DUP has always been the more radical. As a member of the European Parliament, Ian Paisley repeatedly denounced the very institution he belonged to in speeches and protests on the floor. During the pope's visit to the Parliament in October 1988, he held up a placard reading: "John Paul II is Anti-Christ."[135] Paisley's antipapal antics—which he continued in retirement until his death in 2014 (as Lord Bannside)—violated the polite norms of the European public sphere; but viewed in historical perspective, he represented the constant in British attitudes toward Europe. As Alex Greer has put it, "Rev. Paisley's defence of Protestant Britain against a Papal-dominated Europe, historically speaking, is in keeping with British religious values since the Reformation."[136] Although the tone and rhetoric of British mainstream opponents of integration are much more muted than Paisley's were, the central message is quite similar: Europe threatens this blessed nation.

The Catholic Nationalists

We saw above how some conservative Catholic elements have grown dissatisfied with the EU, despite the continued support of the Church hierarchy. Catholic Euroskeptical political movements, though still relatively rare, have emerged, but only when mobilized by a right-wing political party.[137] In Ireland Catholic Euroskepticism has materialized politically during referenda, as we saw above, but has not gravitated to a single political party. In contrast, Euroskeptical parties in Hungary (Jobbik) and

Slovakia (Slovak National Party) have been somewhat more successful in mobilizing the Catholics critics of integration. The anti-EU French National Front, the big winner in the 2014 European Parliament elections, has attracted a segment of nominal Catholics since its inception under Jean-Marie Le Pen. Under the leadership of Marine Le Pen, the party has expanded its reach to more observant Catholics as it has moved to solidify a base in the French countryside where opposition to integration, globalization, and neoliberalism runs high. And although the French episcopate is "deeply committed to Europe," increasing numbers of Catholics voted, as they saw it, for France.[138]

Poland, however, provides the most prominent example of successful right-wing Catholic mobilization. Father Tadeusz Rydzyk's Radio Maryja would have remained a fringe voice if it had not ventured into Polish politics (quite against the wishes of the Church hierarchy) and raised the profile of the political far right. Before 2001 Polish right-wing populism made little impact on postcommunist Poland.[139] But in May 2001 Rydzyk forged an alliance of far-right groups called the League of Polish Families to contest—with the vocal backing of Radio Maryja—the parliamentary elections held later that year. According to Rafal Pankowski, "The endorsement by Father Tadeusz Rydzyk was the single most important factor in securing parliamentary seats for the newly established group."[140] The far right campaigned against Polish EU accession but failed to overcome the weighty endorsement of Pope John Paul II. Following the referendum defeat, the relationship between Rydzyk and the League became strained, and by 2005 Radio Maryja had switched its support from the shrinking League to the rising Law and Justice Party of Lech and Jarosław Kaczyński.[141]

While in power from 2005 to 2007, the Kaczyński twins channeled into a single national integration strategy both Catholic approaches to the EU—populist skepticism and cautious support. They favored Polish membership but in an EU defined as an "intergovernmentalist 'Europe of Nations' rooted in Christianity."[142] In contrast to other approaches to a "Europe of Nations," Law and Justice's version remained heavily influenced by Catholic Christian Democratic thinking. Protecting Polish sovereignty was important as a defense against immoral values and free market liberalism, but Poland should encourage more "solidaristic" or collectivist EU policies.[143] This approach was, frankly, "somewhat schizophrenic," as Poland pushed for greater influence in the Council of Ministers and opt-outs from the Lisbon Treaty while calling for a common European army and greater EU support for farmers.[144] For the radical Catholic right, however, Law and Justice's approach went too far to accommodate the EU. Tensions finally erupted in 2011, as the party ejected a small faction of Catholic nationalists who formed a new, more radical party called United Poland.

The European political parties continue to reflect their confessional cultures. Catholic-inspired Christian Democratic parties remain staunch supporters of

European union, although some conservative Catholics (including recent popes) have become disillusioned with the EU's moral direction. The Protestant-inspired Christian Democratic parties in the Netherlands and the Nordic region remain highly skeptical of the EU, despite evidence that increased contact with continental Christian Democrats has moderated their leaders' view on integration.[145] No moderation, of course, has occurred in the antipapist, anti-EU stance of the Northern Irish DUP, which seems intent on dragging the seventeenth century into the twenty-first.

Notes

1. Kenneth R. Himes, OFM, "Vatican II and Contemporary Politics," in *The Catholic Church and the Nation-State: Comparative Perspectives*, ed. Paul Christopher Manuel, Lawrence C. Reardon, and Clyde Wilcox (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2006), 28.

2. John Paul II, *Ecclesia in Europa*, June 28, 2003, n117, Vatican, www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/apost_exhortations/documents/hf_jp-ii_exh_20030628_ecclesia-in-europa_en.html.

3. For a rational choice assessment of the Catholic Church's role as an interest group, see Carolyn M. Warner, *Confessions of an Interest Group: The Catholic Church and Political Parties in Europe* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).

4. John XXIII, "Pope John's Opening Speech to the Council," October 11, 1962, Christus Rex, www.christusrex.org/www1/CDHN/v2.html.

5. Ibid.

6. Paul VI, "Dogmatic Constitution of the Church: *Lumen Gentium*," November 21, 1964, Vatican, www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_const_19641121_lumen-gentium_en.html.

7. Paul VI, *Gaudium et Spes: Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World*, December 7, 1965, Vatican, www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_const_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html. See also Himes, "Vatican II and Contemporary Politics." in *Catholic Church*.

8. Paul VI, *Gaudium et Spes*, para. 42. See also Himes, "Vatican II," 23.

9. Commission of the Bishops Conferences of the European Community, *The Evolution of the European Union and the Responsibility of Catholics*, May 2005, Commission of Bishops' Conferences of the European Community, 52, www.comece.org/content/site/en/publications/pubcomece/index1.html.

10. Warner, *Confessions*, 217.

11. Robert Leonardi and Douglas A. Wertman, *Italian Christian Democracy: The Politics of Dominance* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989), 200.

12. Eric O. Hanson, *The Catholic Church in World Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), 128–29.

13. Specifically, the pope wrote: "Today the universal common good poses problems of world-wide dimensions, which cannot be adequately tackled or solved except by the efforts of public authorities endowed with a wideness of power, structure and means of the same proportions: that is, of public authorities which are in a position to operate in an effective manner on a world-wide basis. The moral order itself, therefore, demands that such a form of public authority be established." John XXIII, *Pacem in Terris*, April 11, 1963, sec. 137, Vatican, www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_xxiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_j-xxiii_enc_11041963_pacem_en.html.

14. Paul VI, *Gaudium et Spes*.

15. See Blandine Chelini-Pont, "Papal Thought on Europe and the European Union in the Twentieth Century," in *Religion, Politics, and Law in the European Union*, ed. Lucian N. Leustean and John T. S. Madeley (London: Routledge, 2010), 132.

16. The quotations that follow are from the text of the letter "European Unity Based on the Christian Concept of Man," *Catholic Messenger* 80 (August 2, 1962).

17. Chelini-Pont credits Pope Pius XII with supporting specific steps toward integration. In our view, Pius indirectly offered support without naming specific policies. See Chelini-Pont, "Papal Thought," 130–31.

18. See Jo Renee Formicola, *Pope John Paul II: Prophetic Politician* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2002).

19. Steven Greenhouse, "Pope, Visiting France, Calls for a United Europe," *New York Times*, October 9, 1988.

20. John Paul II, "Address of John Paul II during the Visit to the European Parliament, Palace of Europe, Strasbourg, France, 11 October 1988," Vatican, www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/speeches/1988/october/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_19881011_european-parliament_fr.html.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

23. Quoted by George Weigel, *Witness to Hope: The Biography of Pope John Paul II* (New York: Cliff Street Books, 1999), 311.

24. Quoted in ibid., 312.

25. John Paul II, *Ecclesia in Europa*, June 28, 2003, Vatican, www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/apost_exhortations/documents/hf_jp-ii_exh_20030628_ecclesia-in-europa_en.html.

26. Simon Coss, "Holy Orders: Pope John Paul II," *European Voice*, November 7–13, 2002.

27. John Paul II, *Ecclesia in Europa*, n109.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid., n116.

30. Ibid., n114.

31. Ibid., n117.

32. Ibid., n120.

33. "Text of The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe," Eurotreaties, http://www.eurotreaties.com/constitutiontext.html.

34. John Paul II, *Ecclesia in Europa*, n114; John L. Allen Jr., "Pope Bolsters Ailing Spanish Church," *National Catholic Reporter*, May 16, 2003, 6.

35. "Text of The Treaty."

36. See Chelini-Pont, "Papal Thought," 134–36.

37. Quoted by Jonathan Kwitny, *Man of the Century: The Life and Times of Pope John Paul II* (New York: Henry Holt, 1997), 649.

38. Timothy A. Byrnes, "Transnational Religion and Europeanization," in *Religion in an Expanding Europe*, ed. Timothy A. Byrnes and Peter J. Katzenstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 290.

39. Quoted by Ray Taras, "Poland's Transition to a Democratic Republic: The Taming of the Sacred?" in *The Secular and the Sacred: Nation, Religion and Politics*, ed. William Safran (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 138.

40. See José Casanova, "Religion, European Secular Identities, and European Integration," in *Religion in an Expanding Europe*, ed. Byrnes and Katzenstein, 68.

41. John Paul II, "Message of John Paul II to the Polish Bishops," June 10, 1997, Vatican, www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/travels/documents/hf_jp-ii_mes_08061997_bishops_en.html. See also Byrnes, "Transnational," 289.

42. Timothy A. Byrnes, "The Polish Church: Catholic Hierarchy and Polish Politics," in *Catholic Church and the Nation-State*, ed. Manuel, Reardon, and Wilcox 109. See also Byrnes, "Transnational," 290.

43. Quoted by Byrnes, "Polish Church," 112.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid., 113; Taras, "Poland's Transition," 149.

46. A Redemptorist is a member of the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer, a Catholic missionary organization formed in the early eighteenth century.

47. Simona Guerra, "Eurosceptic Allies or Euroenthusiastic Friends? The Political Discourse of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland," in *Representing Religion in the European Union: Does God Matter?* ed. Lucian N. Leustean (London: Routledge, 2013), 141.

48. See Zdzisław Mach, "The Roman Catholic Church in Poland and the Dynamics of Social Identity in Polish Society," in *Religion and Politics: East–West Contrasts from Contemporary Europe*, ed. Tom Inglis, Zdzisław Mach, and Rafał Mazanek (Dublin: University College Dublin Press, 2000), 127.

49. See, e.g., Jesuit Centre for Faith and Justice, "The Catholic Vision and the European Community," *Doctrine and Life* 39 (December 1989): 531–36; and Séamus Murphy, "The European Community and Irish Culture," *The Furrow* 42 (June 1991): 355–60.

50. Edward Pentin, "Former Irish Prime Minister Discusses Views on Europe's Future," *National Catholic Register*, October 14–20, 2003.

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59. See Lucian N. Leustean and John T. S. Madeley, "Religion, Politics, and Law in the European Union: An Introduction," in *Religion, Politics, and Law*, ed. Leustean and Madeley, 1.

60. Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, *Europe Today and Tomorrow: Addressing the Fundamental Issues,* trans. Michael J. Miller (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2007), 21.

61. Ibid., 115.

62. Ibid., 87.

63. Ibid., 23–24.

64. For a sympathetic commentary on Pope Benedict XVI's views on Europe, see George Weigel, *The Cube and the Cathedral: Europe, America, and Politics without God* (New York: Basic Books, 2005).

65. Ratzinger, *Europe Today*, 34.

66. "Our Profession of the Visible Unity of the Church," speech at the Uppsala Jubilee, August 21, 1993, quoted by Susan Sundback, "The Nordic Lutheran Churches and the EU Question in 1994," *Temenos* 37–38 (2001–2): 195.

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68. Philip M. Coupland, "Western Union, 'Spiritual Union,' and European Integration, 1948–1951," *Journal of British Studies* 43, no. 3 (2004): 391.

69. Jean-Paul Willaime, "Protestant Approaches to European Unification," in *Religion in Contemporary Europe*, ed. John Fulton and Peter Gee (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellon Press, 1994), 96.

70. Some of these leaders included Jean Rey, an eventual president of the Commission; Gustav Heinemann, the president of West Germany; and Max Kohnstamm, secretary to the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community. Leustean, *Representing Religion*, 6.

71. Ibid., 6.

72. Coupland, "Western Union," 372.

73. Ibid., 385.

74. Ibid., 386.

75. British Council of Churches and Conference of British Missionary Societies, *Christians and the Common Market: A Report Presented to the British Council of Churches* (London: SCM Press, 1967), 7.

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77. Ibid., 36–37.

78. Ibid., 40.

79. Ibid., 76.

80. "Resolution Adopted at the Meeting of the British Council of Churches, Held on 25th–26th October, 1967," quoted in *Christians and the Common Market*, 5.

81. See Stephen Plat, "British Methodists and Europe: An Unfinished Story," and David Fergusson, "The Kirk: Scottish, British or European?" in *Unterwegs nach Europa: Perspecktiven evangelisher Kirchen / En Route towards Europe: Perspectives of Protestant Churches*, ed. Hans Jürgen Luibl, Christine-Ruth Müller, and Helmut Zeddies (Frankfurt: Verlag Otto Lembeck, 2001), 211–14, 219–21.

82. Sundback, "Nordic Lutheran Churches," 200.

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84. Ibid., 196. See also Susan Sundback, "The Position of the National Lutheran Churches in the Process of European Integration," in *The Transformation of Europe: Social Conditions and Consequences*, ed. Matti Alestalo et al. (Warsaw: IFiS Publishers, 1994), 248.

85. Antti Raunio, "The Contribution of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland towards an Ecumenical and Social Europe," in *Unterwegs nach Europa*, ed. Luibl, Müller, and Zeddies, 47.

86. Peder Hørgaard-Højen, "Denmark, Europe and Leuenberg," in ibid., 72.

87. Willaime, "Protestant Approaches," 101–3.

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92. Willaime, "Protestant Approaches," 107.

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97. Ibid., 204.

98. Willaime, "Protestant Approaches," 107.

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103. Willaime, "Protestant Approaches," 97.

104. Sundback, "Nordic Lutheran Churches," 198.

105. Leustean, *Representing Religion*, 11. For a complete list of religious organizations represented in Brussels and a close analysis of current trends, see ibid., 5–18. See also Frank Turner, "The Roman Catholic Church and the European Institutions: Dialogue and Advocacy at the European Union," in ibid., 77–90.

106. This figure comes from Leustean, *Representing Religion*, 12–13.

107. Mark Hill, "Voices in the Wilderness: The Established Church of England and the European Union," *Religion, State & Society* 37, nos. 1–2 (2009): 174.

108. Quoted by Leustean, *Representing Religion*, 4.

109. See "BEPA: An Overview of Its History," Bureau of European Policy Advisers, http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/about/history/index_en.htm.

110. John T. S. Madeley, "Deus Ex Machina: Representing God on the Stage of the European Union," in *Representing Religion*, ed. Leustean, 48.

111. See David Pollock, "Article 17: Reasons for Concern," in *Representing Religion*, ed. Leustean, 122.

112. Willaime, "Protestant Approaches," 99.

113. See "BEPA Action Programme 2010–2014," Bureau of European Policy Advisers, http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/pdf/about_pdf_see_also/action_programme.pdf, 5.

114. Willaime, "Protestant Approaches," 106.

115. Tariq Ramadan, "Religion and the European Union," in *Representing Religion*, ed. Leustean, 120.

116. See Leonard Ray, "Measuring Party Orientations towards European Integration: Results from an Expert Survey," *European Journal of Political Research* 36 (1999): 283–306.

117. Gary Marks, Carole J. Wilson, and Leonard Ray, "National Political Parties and European Integration," *American Journal of Political Science* 46, no. 3 (2002): 585–94.

118. See David Hanley, "The European People's Party: Towards a New Party Form?" in *Christian Democracy in Europe: A Comparative Perspective*, ed. David Hanley (London: Pinter, 1994), 186–89; and Thomas Jansen, *The European People's Party: Origins and Development* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), 61–70.

119. Hanley, "European People's Party," 191–92.

120. Ibid., 193.

121. Quoted in ibid., 189.

122. For a full discussion of the tensions within the center-right in the 1970s, see Jansen, *European People's Party*, 67–70, 110–13. The EPP merged with the EUCD in 1999 and the EDU in 2002.

123. The EPP absorbed the EDU in 2002. To date, no Icelandic party has joined the EPP.

124. Martin Ball and Jonathan Collett, "Conservative MEPs and the European People's Party: Time for Divorce," Bruges Group, Paper 36 (1 June 1999), www.brugesgroup.com/mediacentre/index.live?article=94.

125. See Geoffrey Howe, *Conflict of Loyalty* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 643–45.

126. See Shirley Williams, *God and Caesar: Personal Reflections on Politics and Religion* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003).

127. See John T. S. Madeley, "Life at the Northern Margin: Christian Democracy in Scandinavia," in *Christian Democratic Parties in Europe since the End of the Cold War*, ed. Steven Van Hecke and Emmanuel Gerard (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2004), 235–39; and John Madeley, "Reading the Runes: The Religious Factor in Scandinavian Electoral Politics," in *Religion and Mass Electoral Behaviour in Europe*, ed. David Broughton and Hans-Martien ten Napel (London: Routledge, 2000), 28–43.

128. Quoted by Mathieu, *Moral Life*, 126. For a detailed discussion of the intraparty debates in the early 1990s, see ibid., 123–92.

129. For a detailed discussion of the internal debate, see ibid., 247–320.

130. Quoted in ibid., 262.

131. The Christian Democratic Appeal was created in 1977 to combine the Catholic People's Party, the Anti-Revolutionary Party, and the Christian Historical Union.

132. The Alliance Party, a liberal alternative in Northern Ireland, also takes a pro-European stance, but it is not aligned with the Catholics or Protestants in the sectarian rivalry.

133. Alex Greer, "From Maastricht to Dublin and Belfast: The Irish Debate European Union," *Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies* 18, no. 2 (1993): 208.

134. "International Affairs," Social Democratic and Labour Party, www.sdlp.ie/issues/international-affairs/.

135. "Ian Paisley Heckles the Pope and Makes a Fool of Himself," October 12, 1988, www.youtube.com/watch?v=7Fm0QOIw8nQ.

136. Greer, "From Maastricht to Dublin," 216.

137. Rafal Pankowski, *The Populist Radical Right in Poland: The Patriots* (London: Routledge, 2010), 120–21.

138. "Catholics to the Rescue of Le Pen," Servizio Informazione Religiosa, May 30, 2014, www.agensir.it/pls/sir/v4_s2doc_b2.europa?tema=Sir+Europa+english&argomento=dettaglio&id_oggetto=288044.

139. Pankowski, *Populist Radical Right*, 78–79.

140. Ibid., 111.

141. Ibid., 156–57.

142. Aleks Szczerbiak, *Poland within the European Union: New Awkward Partner or New Heart of Europe?* (London: Routledge, 2012), 150.

143. Ibid., 149.

144. Ibid., 152–53.

145. Madeley, "Life at the Northern Margin," 238.