



Book Reviews

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Book Reviews

Dilemmas of European Integration: The Ambiguities and Pitfalls of Integration by Stealth

Giandomenico Majone

Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, 241 pp., £42, ISBN 0-19-927430-4 (hbk)

This work is both a *tour de force* and a *tour de horizon* of Giandomenico Majone's career. Whilst a 241 page book on the law, politics, history and future of the European Union is inevitably going to have irritating moments of glibness and superficiality, Majone's intellectual journey has resulted in this book having strengths which make it unsurpassed as a point of first reference for all students, teachers and policy-makers interested in the European Union. It combines Majone's unrivalled insights into the nature of the policy-making process and his eye for detail with his encyclopaedic knowledge of the European Union, and an increasing eagerness to engage, albeit in a highly practical way, with broader questions of political theory and justification. At the grand level, these qualities enable it to avoid the reductionism and ultimately uninteresting conclusions of many intergovernmentalist/institutionalist accounts of the Union. At the same time, it also avoids the inflexible universalism and empty theorising of those self-appointed sadistic superegos of the European Union, many of the Union's legal academy. At the level of detail, also, the wisdom and invention in the book is considerable. To take a few examples: his account of the different types of principal-agent relationship undercuts all existing work on this in EU studies; his analysis of Article 308 EC and implied powers is better than any legal account that I have read; and his discussion of the precautionary principle leaves the existing, pretty unconvincing scholarship in its wake.

Majone's central thesis is that European integration rests upon a central axis. The nation-state is to remain the central arena for core areas of political life in Europe, but markets are to extend beyond the nation-state. Regulation of these markets provides the central justification for the European Union, but this results in its being a confederal arrangement. Its essence is that of an organisation of component units rather than of a unitary political system based on popular sovereignty. The central style of politics is thus one of mixed government in which different interests are represented by different institutions with the central policy question becoming an appropriate balancing of those interests. For Majone, this is the genius of the European Union but it leads to its providing sub-optimal policy results in many fields, as the realisation of broader policy objectives gets lost amongst the maze of procedures, and concern with balancing the interests of the different estates takes precedence over other important policy goals.

Unawareness of these limits has led over time to the development of two pathologies. The first is seeing the European Institutions as the government of the Union. Majone points to the Commission's *White Paper on Governance* as the apogee of this, but cites other undesirable examples: the desire of the supranational institutions to have the trappings of federal governments; the use of the classic Community method as an institutional default position, the limited powers granted to agencies and the institutional meddling with European standardisation. The other is an emphasis on

positive integration. Taking environmental policy, telecommunications and agriculture as his case studies, Majone argues that poor policy-making is a structural feature endemic to European Union policy-making.

A number of proposals are made to remedy this. Majone implies, first, that the Union should be more explicit in its recognition of its confederal status. He points, with approval, to the provision in the Constitutional Treaty granting Member States the right to secede as some evidence of this. Secondly, he argues for changes in the policy-making process. He contends that where political institutions do get involved there should be no presumption that the classic Community method is more efficacious than other methods such as the Open Method of Coordination (OMC). More generally, he suggests that greater power should be transferred to more 'independent' specialised bodies such as regulatory agencies and standardisation bodies. Finally, Majone argues for a redirection of the integration process. In particular, he suggests that the supranational institutions' activities should be confined to securing negative integration and market access, since he sees this as the only prerequisite for a functioning single market which, at the same time, respects other public goods.

There is a heady cocktail of ideas here. Certainly, the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by the French and Dutch referendums seems to confirm Majone's characterisation of the integration process. Yet this reviewer, for one, wonders whether the institutional descriptions are as dichotomous as Majone suggests. All the literature on regulatory capture and the limits of 'command and control' regulation suggest that independent agencies can be as much hostage to interests and corroded as the classic Community method. Moreover, the depiction of the Community method as a battle of interests is a little simplistic: is this really what is taking place in the formulation of the Commission proposal or at trialogues or conciliation? There is a similar concern about the contrast Majone draws between positive and negative integration. Put simply, he underestimates the extent to which legal institutions not merely regulate but also constitute markets. Market access legislation, whilst frequently imposing heavy regulatory burdens, is often unable to bring about market integration as it does not generate a sufficient institutional framework to facilitate transactions. The European car market is subject to about 45 pieces of Community legislation, all exclusively concerned with market access. They have not worked, as there is still only limited market interpenetration, and the industry complains incessantly about the level of regulatory cost imposed by these. If the market, *pace* Majone, is something that ultimately justifies Community action, then we have to know what it is, and on that fundamental point he is disappointingly vague.

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The Politics of Electoral Systems

Michael Gallagher and Paul Mitchell (Eds)

Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, 662 pp., £75, ISBN 0-19-925756-6 (hbk)

This is not just any book on the politics of electoral systems; it is probably *the* book on the politics of electoral systems. The editors aim to fill what they rightly see as a major gap in the literature that has been left, on the one hand, by comparative specialists on electoral systems who are not sufficiently sensitive to the nuances of specific national contexts, and, on the other hand, by national specialists who are not sufficiently *au fait* with the analytic literature on electoral systems. They fill this gap with a very comprehensive and tightly edited volume which offers a wide-ranging set of interesting case studies, and which is supplemented by some more general

chapters, including an introduction by the editors themselves, an evaluation of research in the field of comparative electoral systems by Mathew Shugart, a comparative overview of the politics of electoral reforms by Richard Katz, and a comprehensive conclusion by Michael Gallagher. Experts all.

The core of the book rests with the 22 country chapters, each some 10,000 words or more, and each following more or less closely a common format: dealing first with the origins of the country's electoral system, and going on to look at how the system works, at how it impacts on the parties, parliament, and government formation, and at the politics of electoral reform. The authors of these studies are all highly talented scholars, who usually know the comparative literature as well as their countries. In other words, they know what they are talking about, and they have been given reasonably generous space and good editorial guidance with which to do it. The result is truly impressive.

The country case studies are drawn from across the democratic world, and include long-standing as well as recent democracies. Although the focus is clearly on the politics of the systems, the cases themselves are grouped by broad system type: there is a cluster of chapters on single-member constituency systems (Australia, Canada, France, India, UK, USA); another cluster on mixed systems (Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Russia); another on closed-list systems (Israel, South Africa, Spain); and a final cluster on preferential list systems and single transferable vote (STV) (Austria, Belgium, Chile, Denmark, Finland, The Netherlands, Ireland). These defy summary, but together they make for an excellent volume which will clearly constitute the standard set of references for years to come. It is marred only by the painful punning sub-titles adopted by some of the chapter authors, and which may have looked funny for a day or two: 'holding back the tiers' (Hungary), 'one hundred years of quietude' (Finland), 'the discreet charm of PR-STV' (Ireland).

This is, of course, an increasingly fast-moving field, and since the pace of electoral reform has heated up, there is always a risk of becoming outdated. This has been the case with Roberto D'Alimonte's excellent analysis of the Italian case, which went to press just before the then prime minister Silvio Berlusconi forced through a change of the system from a largely majoritarian single-member district system to a more conventional closed-list PR system with a majority bonus for the winning coalition. D'Alimonte is a sharp enough observer of Italian politics to have hedged his bets, however, and his chapter concludes with a discussion of the preferences for reform and with the speculation that Italy might well move to the system that Berlusconi eventually did put into place, one in which the winning coalition – that is, the electoral coalition with a plurality of votes – is awarded 55 per cent of the seats in the Lower House. According to D'Alimonte, although this was likely to be an attractive option for many of the parties – providing majority government under party-friendly PR conditions – it would meet with opposition in that it would be expected to benefit Berlusconi's coalition (the CdL) rather than the centre-left Union coalition. In the event, Berlusconi was hoist by his own petard. In the 2006 elections, the Union parties won 25,000 more votes than the CdL, and hence it was their coalition which won the strong majority bonus. They also won a very narrow majority in the Senate thanks to another backfiring Berlusconi wheeze – the decision to reserve a handful of seats for election by Italians living abroad, the bulk of whom, to Berlusconi's surprise and shock, voted for the left.

The recent Italian experience serves to indicate how reforming the electoral system might well have unintended or even perverse consequences, which may also explain why Richard Katz notes so few instances of major change – he finds just 14 cases among all the established democracies since the 1950s, five of which occurred in France. Modest changes – including the adoption of proportional representation in the UK for the elections to the devolved parliaments and the European

Parliament – are much more frequent, however, and these may also have unintended consequences, as was the case with the Irish ‘Tullymarder’ in 1977, when, as in Italy in 2006, the opposition ended up by reaping the benefits intended for the government.

Other institutional reforms are probably less unpredictable, and they are also probably less partisan and manipulative in intent. Reading this volume makes one wish for another dealing with those other institutions – parliament, the judiciary, local and regional government – in which the politics of the reform process would also be systematically compared. In sum, this is not only a very valuable contribution, it is also a useful model.

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Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies

Russell J. Dalton

Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004, 242pp., £34, ISBN 0-19-926843-6 (hbk)

This book is concerned with variations in public opinion and, more specifically, in citizens’ trust in politicians, political institutions and the democratic process. The motivation for this study is the observable trend in all advanced industrial democracies of an increase in citizens’ distrust and dissatisfaction towards political institutions. This book systematically tackles one of the currently most relevant issues: the drifting apart of political elites and citizens, and the underlying reasons for this.

Dalton focuses in his analysis on two sets of competing theories of public opinion change. He avoids overly narrow explanations of change in political support which are often solely based on *post-hoc* observations and nation-specific factors by examining developments across nations and across time.

First, he puts forward theories based on socialisation experiences, on changing values, norms and orientations (along with generational change) as well as on media effects. Studying opinions of social groups across time by incorporating post-material values, Dalton concludes that the impact of the media is rather limited, and that expectations of governments and the working of democratic standards have increased. Hence, Dalton draws a rather contradictory picture of the world: while the strong belief in democratic processes is increasing, governments simultaneously are not able to fulfil citizens’ democratic expectations. Second, he examines citizens’ cost–benefit calculations as a possible explanation for public opinion variations. Factors such as citizens’ evaluations of governments’ economic performance as well as citizens’ perceptions of governments’ ability to provide and ensure general well-being (from social services to human rights protection) are put forward in the analyses. Interestingly, Dalton shows that the actual (economic) performance of governments only partly – regarding short-term influences – explains citizens’ decreasing political support. Rather, it is the increasing diversity of citizens’ issue demands that causes support erosion. Governments are no longer able to satisfy all diverging interests, resulting in growing perceptions of a government that is not performing well.

Dalton’s results are hence quite novel and intriguing as he shows that citizens’ political (and to a lesser extent also economic) *expectations* – and not actual government performance – are the major indicators when explaining decline in political support. Based on these findings, he rightly points out that distrust and dissatisfaction are neither a normal nor an insignificant political development and

will rather result in various impacts on the nature of democracies; more particularly it will affect the style of democratic politics: examples put forward are decreasing political compliance resulting in 'softening' of the social contract, and decreasing electoral participation, etc.

Therefore, Dalton urges that new democratic choices be sought. But by the same token he has to acknowledge that the decrease in public support has so far not caused any major political consequences – probably due to the amorphous character of public opinion as he puts it – and if it did, reform ambitions could still not sufficiently address citizens' expectations; for example, various institutional reforms introducing more elements of direct democracy over recent years could not stop the erosion of political support. Dalton concludes by describing briefly a few different theoretical frameworks on how to handle the democratic challenge, such as establishing institutions and processes reacting to citizens' expectations by taking up their different policy interests.

The book represents a major study in the field of public opinion research in general and in our understanding of a decline in political support in particular. Dalton's focus on general, nationally overlapping factors explaining and impacting on public support enriches research in this area and avoids national short-term explanations that could not explain the general decline in public support across contemporary democracies. Dalton sets the basis for a general understanding of decline in public support and the affecting indicators across nations. In addition, the linkage between the various results and the implication for the democratic process of political systems is a promising new trajectory that, however, needs to be analysed further in future research. Finally, the book offers analyses of a very long time span on diverse public opinion data which in this sense are unique. The usage of many different data points provides the reader with a very detailed picture of the (academic) data and shows ways of conducting further analyses.

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The New Transnational Activism

Sidney Tarrow

Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, 276 pp., £14.99, ISBN 0-521-61677-8 (pbk), £40, ISBN 0-521-85130-0 (hbk)

The protests of the late 1990s and the early years of the new century, such as the global justice movement or the worldwide protests against the Iraq war, have stimulated a lively debate within the social sciences about the rise of a new transnational activism. Against the backdrop of an extensive and diverse literature and using a large number of case studies from all over the world, Sidney Tarrow succeeds impressively in developing a theoretical framework for a complex understanding of the mechanisms and processes of new – and old – forms of transnational contention.

Transnational activism, he stresses, is not the product of a global imaginary, but of domestically rooted activists. Thus, he broadens the notion of transnational activism, so far mainly understood as the action of self-conscious internationalists, by perceiving transnational activists as 'rooted cosmopolitans', who move physically and cognitively outside their regions of origin, but remain closely linked to their domestic networks, resources, experiences and opportunities. They are able to mobilise domestic and international resources and opportunities to advance claims on behalf of external actors, against external opponents, or in favour of goals they hold in common with transnational allies.

Tarrow points out that neither cosmopolitanism nor transnational activism is a new phenomenon, but that the accelerated growing connections across borders and increased capacities of citizens to mobilise both within and outside of their societies has led to new global attitudes and new forms of organisation and campaigns. He claims that globalisation is only partially connected to the outpouring of contention across borders; instead, internationalism is the institutional and informal framework within which transnational activism takes shape. According to Tarrow, internationalism is more than a flatly horizontal system of states or a supra-state structure, but a triangular structure of relations among states, non-state actors, and international institutions, which produces new opportunities for actors to engage in collective action at different levels of this system.

Building on these conceptual clarifications, he distinguishes six processes of transnational contention that have different implications for fusing domestic and international activism: Framing issues globally (1) and mounting domestic contention against an international institution (2) may lead to internationalisation, but will not produce permanent links across borders. Diffusion of particular forms of collective action (3) and a shift in the scale of contention (4) will help to unify the repertoire of contention across borders, but both processes are temporary. Externalisation of domestic contention (5) and the formation of durable transnational coalitions (6) are the strongest signs that a fusion of domestic and international contention is taking place. Tarrow illustrates these processes and their constituting mechanisms vividly with numerous cases studies.

He concludes that transnational activism will be episodic and contradictory and will have its most visible impact on domestic politics. International institutions, regimes and treaties will continue to reflect state relations and state power. Yet they will increasingly provide opportunity structures for transnational activists to lobby and protest, to encounter others like themselves and to occasionally form successful global-national coalitions. Finally, 'transnational activism does not resemble a swelling tide of history but is more likely a series of waves that lap on an international beach, retreating repeatedly into domestic seas but leaving incremental changes on the shore' (p. 219).

The New Transnational Activism is a very important book that provides a profound and systematic framework to conceptualise the diverse expressions of international contention we are facing nowadays. This book encourages further intense methodological and empirical work, that should, building on Tarrow's general point of departure, fine-tune the theoretical framework in the scientific debate.

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Building Europe's Parliament: Democratic Representation Beyond the Nation State

Berthold Rittberger

Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, xv + 234 pp., £45, ISBN 0-19-927342-1 (hbk)

The issue of institutional design in the European Union is central to debates about the so-called 'democratic deficit'. Much discussion of this issue has focused on the nature of European Parliament (EP) elections and the possibilities of shifting more power either back to the EU's member states or upwards to its supranational institutions. Rittberger's book adds to the literature on institutional design by using the democratic deficit as an independent variable to explain the creation of the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in the early

1950s, and the assignment of executive control, budgetary and legislative powers to what has since become the European Parliament. In doing so, the book provides a theoretical framework potentially applicable to the democratisation of other forms of international co-operation and integration.

Rittberger argues that rational choice and sociological institutionalist accounts of the EP's powers are deficient. Instead he develops a theoretical model in which 'legitimising beliefs' influence decisions on constitutional principles while the details of a constitutional settlement are affected by distributive bargaining. According to the model, the pooling of sovereignty in order to generate material benefits leads to a gap between consequentialist legitimacy, based on the outputs of the system, and procedural legitimacy, i.e. the extent to which decision-making is democratically controlled. The gap between these two types of legitimacy is filled by institutional reforms, but the nature of these will depend on the size of the gap, as perceived by elites, and on the form of governance that they believe to be most appropriate. Rittberger's hypotheses are tested rigorously in several different scenarios and are well supported by the extensive evidence marshalled. For example, the decision to create a Common Assembly (CA) as part of the ECSC was an attempt to fill the legitimacy gap created by investing power in the High Authority over the member states' coal and steel markets. That this gap was filled with an assembly results at least partly from the German government's belief in the value of a federal model of democracy. The precise powers of the assembly resulted from bargaining among the member states. Most were against the granting of legislative powers to the CA. Hence the German government accepted a largely toothless assembly, preferring this to a deal which excluded any kind of parliamentary institution. The explanations for empowering the EP with budgetary and legislative influence later in the book are convincing and help to show how member states that were reluctant to increase the EP's powers could be shamed into doing so through appeals to the need for democratic governance within the EU.

From a rational choice perspective, one might argue that the choice facing the founders of the ECSC of either a unicameral or bicameral parliament could affect policy outcomes and hence might have been made on the basis of distributional concerns rather than legitimising beliefs. But the evidence presented here suggests member states did not arrive at the negotiations with pre-defined policies on this question. It is also worth noting that rising Euroscepticism may mean that future negotiations are affected by questioning of the *consequentialist* legitimacy of integration. This and other elements of bargaining may also be affected if referendums are to be used more widely than prior to the Constitutional Treaty.

Overall, this is an excellent book that provides surely the best systematic attempt to explain the existence and powers of the European Parliament. The research design is rigorous and the coverage broad. The book should be read by scholars of the EP and of European integration more broadly. It also poses some interesting questions about the legitimacy of international organisations and should inspire further research on this issue.

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Citizens of Europe? The Emergence of a Mass European Identity

Michael Bruter

Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2005, 256 pp., £45, ISBN 1-4039-3239-5 (hbk)

This book offers a new, insightful, historically informed assessment of the influences on European identity in a cross-national comparative context. It brings together data

from European Union countries and draws upon surveys, experiments, and focus groups to address questions about the process of European identity formation. The study argues persuasively that there is both a civic and a cultural dimension to European identity.

Drawing on Eurobarometer survey data since 1970, as well as experiments and focus groups designed and conducted by the author, this study focuses on the emergence of 'a mass European identity and what has influenced it' (p. 20), and the evolution of European identity. The book sets forth three hypotheses that are supported by the author's research:

1. The exposure of European citizens to news on the achievements or failures of European integration will influence their level of European identity.
2. Exposure to symbols of European integration stimulates the development of a European identity by individual European citizens.
3. The survival and increasing political significance of the EU as an institutionalised political system reinforces a mass European identity. This effect will be combined with the individual experience and socialisation of the individual.

Bruter proposes a model of institutional impact on the emergence of a mass European identity over time. The model can be formulated in two ways, at the individual level and at the aggregate level. The research question for the former concerns the level of European identity of an individual at any given time, which is the dependent variable. The independent variables are exposure to 'good' or 'bad' news about European integration, the individual's level of European experience, and the individual's national context as it pertains to the salience and durability of European integration. Survey based experiments are used to test this model, in the UK, France and the Netherlands, customised to measure the dependent variable in its cultural and civil components. The research question at the aggregate level concerns the process of emergence and evolution over time of a mass European identity. The independent variables are symbols of European integration and their diffusion, 'good' and 'bad' news on European integration over time, and the inertia of institutions.

The study argues that news and information play an important role in shaping European identity and opinion. Although this argument is not new, it is novel to put it forward without any data on how the news is actually reporting on Europe. Surprisingly, there are also no references to the literature on this subject (including work by this reviewer) that provide real evidence on the tone of reporting about European politics and institutions, nor is there any discussion of the existence of data on the content over time of media reporting on the European Union conducted by independent firms. There is also no mention of the content of the news collected by the European Union's own offices in each country to inform them about the visibility and reception of the EU 'on the ground' so to speak.

How then does one make an argument about the influence of news while at the same time choosing to ignore entirely the actual content of news about Europe? One must delve into the third appendix to find out: there are several pages devoted to arguments outlining the many difficulties that might be encountered in coding objectively 'all good and bad news on Europe in the various contexts of the European Union' (p. 207). Instead, an implied better approach of a subjective measure is used in this study: Eurobarometer survey questions asking respondents how they felt about the information on the EU that they saw 'over the past 12 month' in the media – whether they 'felt the information gathered in the media

tended to be quite positive, quite negative, or neither positive nor negative on the whole' (p. 208). A good/bad news index, a key independent variable in the study, is then constructed based on the answers given, and this is described as an imperfect 'summary of perceptions of news on the European Union as a whole' (p. 208). The author acknowledges that these measures are far from perfect and that because the Eurobarometer questions were not always asked and not always asked in the same way, there are missing values that had to be replaced by some other value to impute the good news/bad news index.

It is unfortunate that the Eurobarometer questions provide such a weak measure of media exposure over time. It is no secret among those who conduct media uses and effects research that there is noise and randomness in the responses to survey questions measuring exposure even when the exposure measures are specific to certain types of media or outlets and offer a reasonably narrow or memorable window of time (e.g. 'in the past week'). To ask whether one was exposed to information about the EU during 'the past 12 months' really has nothing to do with actual media exposure behaviour.

Despite the obvious flaws with these particular Eurobarometer questions which do not appear to be informed by research on measuring exposure to news, and despite the fact that literature on the measurement of media uses and effects is hardly addressed in this volume, congratulations are due for making a compelling and very probably correct argument in the main text of the volume about the likely effects of the news on European identity. If one does not read the details in the last pages of the last appendix or know much about content analysis and measurement of media use, then one would be less critical about the lack of data behind what is described as the 'good' and 'bad' news independent variable here. After all, the thrust of most of the media-informed research on Europe shows that the news is an important influence on public opinion about Europe. In European referendums, news can actually influence outcomes.

The book is valuable for scholars, students and practitioners interested in contemporary European politics and institutions, especially for the historical insights and the multi-dimensional aspects of civic and cultural identification provided by this assessment of European identity and opinions over time.

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The Judicial Construction of Europe

Alec Stone Sweet

Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004, 294 pp., £58, ISBN 0-19-927552-1 (hbk)

Until relatively recently the institutional role of the European Court of Justice in the process of European integration was largely underplayed by political and social scientists with one or two notable exceptions. Over the last decade, however, the work of mainly American political scientists and international lawyers, Stone Sweet, Alter, Cichowski, and Slaughter, among others, has provided a rich seam of research on the contribution of the Court. Stone Sweet's latest book is the culmination of ten years of research developed with a talented group of graduate students, as co-authors of several chapters. His central premise is that processes of argumentation by the Court, or 'judicialisation', impact on the pace and depth of integration, enhancing the polity's federal character. The Court has developed 'doctrinal structures' that are incremental and path dependent, conditioned by earlier litigation, but, and here lies the theoretical core, the process leads to institutional change based

on the 'symbiotic properties' of strategic behaviour and normative deliberation. In this way a supranational constitution is 'constructed' by the Court. Three areas are chosen for analysis – free movement of goods, sex equality, and environmental protection.

For Stone Sweet, 'judicialisation' arises from a mix of precedent and constitutional balancing by the Court where the law is most indeterminate, of which the principle of proportionality is perhaps the most important technique. The larger the 'zone of discretion' exercised by the Court the greater its influence on the evolution of the polity. In practice, the Court's rulings have often had a normative effect, or created what Dicey once described as 'judicial legislation', but this has arisen because its core function in the selected areas is, after deliberation, to reach collective decisions on questions referred by national courts. Even in areas where the law is indeterminate, the Court's approach is essentially functional not doctrinal and, although the cumulative effect is evolutionary, there is little evidence to suggest that the Court has *consistently* promoted a federal objective or has sought to construct a constitution. Although the individual, often extra-judicial, observations of judges provide a useful insight, the Court does not have a collective mindset. Moreover, the Court does not follow a strict doctrine of precedent, in the sense understood by common lawyers, but tends to reinforce and adapt its previous decisions with the aim of providing more certain guidance to national courts, but without being tied to 'path dependence'.

On occasion, however, the Court will bring the evolutionary process to a halt by overturning its previous decisions without being over-fussy about the reasoning or indicating the cases that are no longer good law, as in *Keck and Mithouard*, discussed in chapter 3. As the chapter on sex discrimination compellingly shows, the Court has consistently reiterated key passages of its rulings, but the authors' analysis also reveals that there is an almost even divide between those cases that are rights-oriented, such as *Defrenne*, and those that restrict the exercise of the same rights, notably *Bilka*. Codification of these rulings, such as the Equal Treatment Directive of 2003, indicates approval of the Court's constitutional balancing but also a desire to restrict the scope for further evolution. Proportionality is indeed an important technique for judicial rationalisation, but it is quite separate from precedent/path dependence, as is shown by the Court's application of the principle in cases such as *Omega*, to allow national administrations discretion to uphold their own constitutional protection of fundamental rights even where there is a conflict with the exercise of Community rights guaranteed by the Treaties.

Stone Sweet reaches two sound conclusions. He demonstrates, firstly, that the course of European integration has been profoundly influenced by the work of the Court and, secondly, its case law has had far-reaching effects on policy outcomes and the behaviour of non-judicial actors. He is right in asserting that the Court has been 'extraordinarily successful at inducing legal and political elites to reproduce the modes of reasoning it had applied, on a step-by-step basis in the past, to the problems of the present' (p. 243). It does not follow, however, that the Court has an agenda to 'judicialise' policy-making or to construct a constitution. Differing explanations for the Court's judicial behaviour should not, however, detract from welcoming this impressively researched and thought-provoking book that should be read by all those who have an interest in EU constitutionalism, including those who reject the view that the Court has a particular doctrinal standpoint but fully acknowledge its leading influence on the ebb and flow of the European integration process.

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Varieties of Capitalism and Europeanization: National Response Strategies to the Single European Market

Georg Menz

Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, 280 pp., £47, ISBN 0-19-927386-3 (hbk)

This book provides a detailed comparative study of government regulation of the wages and employment conditions of 'posted workers' in the construction sector. As Menz points out, cross-border labour subcontracting poses a potentially serious challenge to workers in construction and other service sectors, but governments retain the ability to counter this challenge through 're-regulation' at the national level. In the landmark *Rush Portuguesa* ruling of 1990, the European Court of Justice struck down the French government's decision to require work visas for Portuguese workers posted to a construction site near Paris, but also noted that community law 'does not forbid that the member states apply their legislation or their collectively agreed wage regulations to all persons performing a paid activity upon their territory' (p. 17). Menz argues that the domestic politics of re-regulation in this arena represents a form of 'horizontal Europeanisation' that is distinct from the top-down and bottom-up processes discussed in the recent Europeanisation literature.

Menz's case studies yield four distinct national response patterns. In Luxembourg, Belgium and Finland, governments simply reaffirmed existing labour laws, which effectively precluded the possibility of posted workers being treated differently from regular workers. In Denmark and Sweden, unions and employer associations swiftly entered into bilateral 'gentlemen's agreements' that precluded wage differentiation and allowed unions to take strike action against any firms that might violate these agreements. In Austria, Norway and France, governments stepped in with new legislation providing for the extension of collectively bargained wage rates to posted workers in the early 1990s. Finally, in Germany and, to a lesser extent, the Netherlands, governments failed to protect domestic workers against subcontracting from abroad. Not passed until 1996, German legislation stipulated that employers and unions should negotiate a special minimum wage for posted workers. As a result of employer intransigence, this minimum wage came to be set considerably below the lowest wage bracket for regular construction workers.

Menz argues that national response strategies are 'indicative' of three factors: (a) the balance of power between unions and employers, (b) the interests of employers and (c) the 'response capacity of... distinct models of politico-economic governance' (p. 187). His explanatory framework thus incorporates all the major strands of the comparative political economy. While Menz's argument about the balance of power between unions and employers is straightforward, it is also entirely conventional. As for the interests of employers, the core proposition seems to be that small and medium-sized firms will be more supportive of national re-regulation than larger, more internationally oriented firms. As Menz himself points out, however, big French construction companies never mobilised against re-regulation and their German equivalents were keen to reach a deal with the unions. Employer intransigence in the German case emanated from outside the construction sector. In view of this, I am not sure why Menz considers employer interests to be important. I am also not sure what he means by the 'response capacity' of distinct models of politico-economic governance or in what sense this can be considered an explanatory variable.

Like much of the comparative political economy literature, Menz invokes cross-national diversity of institutional conditions to explain diversity of outcomes. But is this really a case of diversity of outcomes? Leaving the German case aside, the countries all seem to end up with very similar levels of protection against wage competition from posted workers, despite different legal traditions, industrial relations institutions and parties in government. From a somewhat different

perspective, Menz's account poses the following puzzle: why does the French response to the threat of posted workers resemble that of the small corporatist countries while the German response does not? Though full of empirical insights, the book unfortunately does not solve this puzzle in a way that advances the debate over how we should conceptualise varieties of European capitalism.

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The Boundaries of Welfare. European Integration and the New Spatial Politics of Social Protection

Maurizio Ferrera

Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, 299 pp., £58, ISBN 0-19-928466-0 (hbk), £19.99, ISBN 0-19-928467-9 (pbk)

Three groups of readers will be particularly interested in this excellent book. One group are those scholars interested in the policies, modes and dynamics of European social policy integration. The second group are scholars interested in the many faces of Europeanisation in general and in identifying that 'Europe' often comes 'through the backdoor' and mostly via various detours. The third group are those who wish to read an intellectually challenging, well-written, and didactically clearly structured study on one of the major fields of public policy – and one of the most controversial and explosive issues in European integration politics.

The book is of a very high intellectual standard throughout. Ferrera deliberates about his topic, discusses the complexities in a balanced and reflected manner, and draws cautious conclusions that are supported by solid empirical evidence. The author discusses two key questions: to what extent and in what ways has the process of European integration re-drawn the boundaries of national welfare states? What are the effects of such redrawing regarding the territorial and membership dimension of social policy? Though there has been a growing literature on social policy integration, Ferrera has developed a distinctive and refreshing perspective on what happens within and beyond member states.

Drawing primarily on the work of Rokkan and Hirschmann and anchored in the classical 'state-formation' and 'nation-building' perspective in political science, his intellectual and argumentative point of reference is the problematic relationship between the 'opening pressures' linked to European integration and the 'closure foundations' of the nation-based welfare state which has been the tried and tested home of 'instinctive solidarity' for more than 100 years and which is exposed to an ongoing process of de-nationalisation, de-territorialisation, and national disintegration. Ferrera provides rich empirical evidence for the fact that European integration has affected the various components of the welfare state in different ways and with different degrees of intensity, originating simultaneously destabilising *and* restructuring effects. Well aware of the fact that European social policy integration is a demanding, highly political and politicised project, Ferrera finally discusses how solidarity and Europe might be reconciled through stronger citizenship rights and the development of an intelligent institutional framework. He carefully delineates an 'incremental social supranationalism' (p. 239) scenario which allows domestic arrangements to be gradually 'nested' within EU-level competencies in a wider, multilevel bounded space.

Ferrera sets out a sophisticated analytical framework for the exploration of spatial politics. Applied to European integration politics, it is instructive and fundamental in three respects: it directs attention back to the unresolved and delicate political and social implications of the uneven process of eroding the social sovereignty of

the nation-state, completing the internal market, and (partially) restating the welfare state at supranational level; it contributes to the conceptualisation and empirical understanding of the momentous changes and dilemmas in place at both levels; and it helps to comprehend the present and future challenges 'Europe' as a political and social community faces. Even though the perspective on boundary shifting and boundary re-drawing may attract criticism from traditional social policy researchers, Ferrera's book provides a refreshing stimulus to the debate on the transformation of national welfare states and European social policy alike. Overall, *The Boundaries of Welfare* is an example of outstanding scholarship that makes a substantial contribution to the academic as well as political debate. It represents a splendid example of how research in the field of social policy can not only be theoretically informed, but also empirically grounded, including a well-balanced and differentiated view forward.

Wolfram Lamping
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Ideas and Welfare State Reform in Western Europe

Peter Taylor-Gooby (Ed.)

Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2005, xv + 179 pp., £45, ISBN 1-4039-9317-3 (hbk)

The role of ideas in European and global social policy making and debate has attracted increased attention in recent years. What are the ideas that lie behind welfare state reforms in European countries, especially EU member states, during the last 15–20 years? How to link ideas and political action? In an introductory chapter Peter Taylor-Gooby spells out that in order to understand the role of ideas one has to analyse policy paradigms and political discourse. The paradigm approach is intended to explain the link between the normative and cognitive levels in terms of an overall framework that specifies the nature of the issues, the specific goals to be attained and the methods to be used in reform. Discourse analysis – the language, symbols and metaphors used in communication – provides an approach to understanding processes of framing. Paradigms are constructed through discourse which links together cognitive and normative elements. The paradigm argument focuses on policy learning, while discourse analyses clarify the complexity of the process whereby paradigm change takes place. Discourse theory offers an alternative – or supplementary – way of analysing policy-making processes to institutional and rational choice approaches.

The book presents seven empirical chapters and draws on more than 250 interviews with key actors in social policy making at the EU level and in seven countries, Finland, France, Germany, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Analyses vary as to comparative outlook, but all discuss paradigm change and the role of discourse and other factors in relation to reforms in areas in which, it is argued, major policy shifts have taken place: labour market policies (two chapters), social care for older people and children (two chapters), pension policies (one chapter), social assistance (one chapter) and at the broader EU level (one chapter). It is claimed that a common idea of reduced state intervention and increased role for individuals and other actors runs through European social policy reforms in these areas, that there are examples of convergence, but that both characteristics and policy paradigms of the various welfare state regimes traditionally distinguished between appear to remain. Shifts in policy discourse have facilitated reforms.

The book strongly argues that ideas by various actors have assumed greater significance in the politics of European welfare state reform, in policy learning and

policy transfer. The book represents a new, methodologically challenging, approach to the study of welfare state change in Europe, conveying, more explicitly than other policy change studies, the perspective that ideas matter in the context of old (national) and new (European and international) institutions and common structural factors such as market-driven European integration; changing labour markets and changing composition of the population. The comparative study of policy discourse and paradigms, how policy and reform proposals in various contexts are argued for, justified, discussed and agreed upon, adds to our understanding of why welfare state reforms come about.

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States of Liberalization. Redefining the Public Sector in Integrated Europe

Mitchell P. Smith

State University of New York Press, Albany, 2005, 242 pp., £42.50, ISBN 0-7914-6543-8 (hbk)

Globalisation and free markets coincide with a redefinition of the public sector. Previously unchallenged public functions have been challenged and have been opened up to private competitors. For member states in the European Union this global transition is augmented as European competition law exerts specific pressures for liberalisation on the public sector. European integration, as is well established, favours negative integration, the making of markets. In his book, Mitchell P. Smith asks how this pressure is applied and what happens when member states resist liberalisation because they want to continue pursuing political objectives alongside economic activities.

This is a fascinating book. Placing his study in the context not only of European integration but also the international political economy literature, Smith singles out four major market-making forces of the EU. These are the regulatory bias of the EU; the liberalisation bias of the institutional setting with the largely independent Commission and European Court of Justice; the interests of member states in 'state hardening' (i.e. of making credible commitments towards restructuring through recourse to the European level); and private sector mobilisation. It is this latter factor, where those actors profiting from liberalisation turn to the European level to claim rights not available in the domestic political process that appears particularly relevant for analysing the scope and limits of European liberalisation moves. In his hypotheses, Smith terms this the 'political mobility of capital', in parallel to capital mobility. As empirical case studies, Smith analyses the relative failure of the opening of public procurement; the slow liberalisation of postal services (which is contrasted with the liberalisation of telecommunications and electricity); and the liberalisation of German public banks, notably the Westdeutsche Landesbank, in three consecutive chapters.

In order to overcome domestic opposition to liberalisation, the mobilisation of private actors is crucial, leading to an expansion of participation intruding on previously cosy elite relationships between bureaucrats and public companies. In public procurement, this failed as costs for private actors seeking to force the opening of markets were too high, given that public actors could retaliate. In postal services as well as in German public banking private actors' complaints to the European Commission eventually led to cases at the European Court of Justice. With the threat of Court cases, the uncertain future of monopoly profits and the growing awareness that forgone opportunities for foreign expansion are the price to pay for the status quo, the traditional supporters of the monopolies

reconsidered their preferences. European liberalisation forces, to sum up Smith's argument, are not an unconstrained steamroller, but they resonate with domestic actors' interests.

Negative integration and the liberalisation of the public sector in Europe have attracted much scholarly attention. Not everything Smith writes about is therefore unheard of. The significant achievement of the book is that it presents a coherent set of hypotheses for explaining the successes and failures of European liberalisation policy that is backed by well-written and interesting case studies. The book will therefore be essential reading for a broad audience, encompassing on the one hand those interested in single market policies and on the other hand those studying Europeanisation processes of member states. After all, where does Europe hit harder but by redefining the public tasks of its member states?

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Limits of European Citizenship: European Integration and Domestic Immigration Policies

Maarten Vink

Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2005, 240 pp., £45, ISBN 1-4039-3936-5 (hbk)

The book considers whether national citizenship has been replaced by European citizenship and whether national citizenship is still relevant in the functioning of European politics. It aims to study two main aspects: (1) the devaluation of national citizenship, and (2) the extent to which European citizenship is meaningful.

The first aspect is tested through the analysis of Dutch immigration politics and the second through the analysis of how Europeanisation has affected changes in Dutch national citizenship. The first part of the book provides a general 'conceptual' and historical background by introducing in three separate chapters the concept of citizenship, European citizenship and immigration in the context of European integration. The study of three policy areas: asylum policy, resident status and nationality in the Netherlands constitute the empirical core of the book. According to the author, these policy areas are significantly related to the realisation of full membership that is the underlining principle of citizenship. In the end, the author argues that the limits of European citizenship derive mainly from the limited impact of European integration on national citizenship. The general argument goes against the view of European citizenship as 'post-national citizenship' or as leading to multiple citizenship in Europe. In principle, however, the author agrees on some arguments about the 'potentially undermining consequences for national citizenship'. Overall, the book is informative and sketches recent developments on European citizenship and European immigration policy, though the situation in the Netherlands is obviously treated in much greater detail. It is written in a stylish way that makes it pleasant to read.

One of the major shortcomings of the book is that the conceptual chapters, which in theory should set the stage for the empirical work, are too broad in scope while the empirical part focuses mainly on Dutch immigration and citizenship policy and politics. This effectively limits the degree to which *Limits of European Citizenship* can provide the basis for any sort of generalisation and makes the title of the book rather misleading. The reader might easily question how the empirical analysis of immigration policy in the Netherlands can substantiate the central purpose of the book: the devaluation of national citizenship. Another weak point of the book is to study asylum (chapter 5), which is treated at both national and supranational level separately from immigration policy, as a 'first insight' into the question of changes

in national citizenship. This chapter is too limited to discuss the proportional distribution of asylum in Europe and the fact that asylum is an area where executives enjoy a privileged position towards domestic parliaments. This, according to the author, constitutes an opportunity structure that has substantial consequences for asylum policies, but it does not explain how this matters in terms of changing national citizenship in Europe. There is a methodological shortcoming as most of the empirical evidence is based on Dutch parliamentary debates that are used and displaced rather unsystematically.

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Universities and the Europe of Knowledge: Ideas, Institutions and Policy Entrepreneurship in European Union Higher Education Policy, 1955–2005

Anne Corbett

Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2005, 256 pp., £45, ISBN 1-4039-3245-X (hbk)

This very interesting book may be summarised in one sentence: institutions make things possible, but individuals make things happen. Enriching the debate on the importance of structure and agency, the author applies John Kingdon's well known multiple streams model to the EU's higher education policy. Anne Corbett achieves with clarity and precision her goal of painting a rich tapestry of influential policy entrepreneurs and the strategies that made them succeed in urging the EU to acquire greater competence in higher education affairs. The end result is a welcome empirical analysis of policy change in the EU and a valuable contribution to the literatures on comparative public policy and Europeanisation.

The author situates her analysis firmly in the tradition of sociological institutionalism without losing track of the impact of individuals upon structure. Two-related questions guide her research: first, how and why did the EU become involved in higher education, and, second, what impact did individuals related to the Commission have on propelling this agenda forward? Having a European dimension in national higher education is now taken as a given, but it was not always so. Examining four episodes (decisions) of policy spanning almost 50 years, she identifies eight policy entrepreneurs who played a major part in creating and developing the EU's higher education policy. For example, she identifies Guichard and Spinelli as the major entrepreneurs behind the 1971 decision to create a European University Institute and Jones, Sutherland, Richonnier as influential behind the 1987 Erasmus decision to bring higher education under Community rules. As an epilogue, she recounts how the work of these individuals helped bring about the Bologna process in 1999, which created the European Higher Education Area, a policy domain of congruence but not convergence.

There is much to recommend about this book. The author's emphasis on the entrepreneurs' life experience – an amendment to Kingdon's model – and manipulating strategies as conditions of success is a welcome addition to the literature on policy change. By placing entrepreneurs in the midst of institutions, the reader gains greater insight into how actors used and responded to structure to push for meaningful change. Moreover, her conclusion that the European dimension is simply an extension of normal national politics, which creates new risks and opportunities, seems fair and appropriate.

Just like all studies, there are drawbacks to this picture. The methodological purists amongst us will object to a time frame of 50 years, which does not permit a tight and exhaustive examination of the evidence. On a more theoretical level, the emphasis on specific individuals risks becoming an idiosyncratic explanation.

For example, were there any other individuals who played a role in pushing the higher education agenda forward? She says so, but downplays their impact. Why? Were they less successful? If so, we can learn as much from success as we can from failure. And even if we know their life experiences, does this mean we can better predict which entrepreneur will do what more successfully? Finally, a pictorial box cataloguing the hypotheses in terms of successful strategies and life experiences would have been very helpful in wrapping everything up.

These minor quibbles aside, this is a good book. It is a welcome addition to the literature on public policy and EU studies. Most importantly, the study sensitises us to the importance of individuals in pursuing policy change. Perhaps the time has come for political scientists to shift attention from the study of institutional norms and rules, a road well travelled, to the study of how individuals interpret and express those rules in making public decisions, a largely unknown but potentially rewarding path.

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Popular Protest in East Germany, 1945–1989

Gareth Dale

Routledge, London, 2005, 264 pp., £65, ISBN 0-7146-5408-6 (hbk)

This book fills an important gap in the market for books on the GDR. It discusses with admirable detail the latest research on two of the best-researched topics of GDR history: the uprising of 1953, and the protest movement that developed from 1987 to culminate in the fall of the Berlin Wall.

On the 1953 uprisings, Dale notes the complexity of the fragmented strikers' demands, which were not always political: they were in part about unrealistic work norms, but in part also about demands for immediate improvements at the workplace. After the uprising, the SED leadership pursued a policy of strengthening its control by tightening its internal organisation, by streamlining the SED and its control over other mass organisations, while also expanding the state security services (Stasi). At the same time, the SED sought to meet potential workers' opposition by responding where possible to social and economic working-class concerns. By thus dividing and accommodating potential oppositionists, the SED managed to limit the growth of popular protest until the late 1980s. Then, the SED's refusal to follow Moscow's lead in *perestroika* and *glasnost* met with the GDR's growing economic collapse which made it increasingly difficult to satisfy the workers' material demands. Combined with the growing ability of a fragmented opposition movement developing mainly through the churches, this led to the renewal of popular dissatisfaction and resistance which the SED could no longer control.

As its title suggests, this book focuses very much on the development (and the non-development between 1954 and 1987) of popular protest – as a result, the actions of party leaders do not always get the attention they deserve. For instance, the state's unwillingness to overcome the growing unrest before the GDR's fortieth anniversary on 7 October 1989 is not developed sufficiently. As Dale notes, it is precisely in the days surrounding this event that the confrontation came to a head, and that the military option against the demonstrators appeared at its most viable. Dale also spends little time discussing Honecker's successors, Krenz and Modrow. Yet surely Krenz's hardline reputation was important in failing to convince the crowds that, following Honecker's departure, the SED regime was capable of genuine reform. The book is also somewhat misadvertised: there is little that surprises here. This is not really a monograph, as very little original research finds its way into

the analysis: the author does make use of his personal interviews with contemporary protestors (though not, unfortunately, with actors from the security forces), but these embellish rather than transform our understanding of the revolution. This book is at its best when the author discusses his findings in the light of different theoretical models, but these sections do not frame the argument; rather, they make relatively infrequent appearances in the narrative.

At the same time, this is an exceedingly useful book. Dale presents a very subtle, concise and convincing analysis of the rich and complex literature that has emerged on the protest movements of 1953 and 1989. There are some important points here, for instance his insistence on the fragmented nature of the opposition not just after the fall of the Berlin Wall, but also before: Even in the early days of the mass protests, in October 1989, the civic forum found it easier to enter into dialogue with the SED leadership than with the working classes. Dale also makes a very good job of the difficult task of writing a book that focuses on two rather disparate events (as Dale shows) while also linking them with each other, and with the intervening period of the GDR's history. For all these reasons, and because so little else has been published on this important subject in English, this is a very welcome book.

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The French Communist Party during the Fifth Republic: A Crisis of Leadership and Ideology

Gino G. Raymond

Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2005, 256 pp., £50, ISBN 1-4039-9612-1 (hbk)

The French Communist Party (PCF) occupies a unique place in French political history. While other parties have exhibited the typical characteristics of French parties – transience, break-up through doctrinal quarrels and personal rivalries, and a weak and inconsistent voter base, the PCF has persisted since 1920, and is still with us. Until the 1980s it had a loyal and substantial voter-base – it polled 20 per cent of the vote in the legislative election of 1978 – a formidably disciplined organisation, the largest membership of any party, and a strong presence in municipal government and the Trade Union movement. By 1981 it was obvious that things were going badly wrong for the party. Against a background of soul-searching and factional warfare within the party, the decline in its fortunes has continued. At the presidential election of 2002 the party's candidate polled 3.37 per cent of the votes cast; at the first round of the subsequent legislative elections it polled 4.82 per cent.

Gino Raymond seeks to answer three questions: 1) Why was the PCF so strong? 2) What went wrong? and 3) Does the PCF have a role any more? In doing so, Raymond makes a welcome contribution to the literature, synthesising in an accessible and very readable form a wealth of material, much of which is not available in English.

Raymond suggests that the party was, for its members and supporters an 'ethno-culture' – a 'people' defined not by territory, but by ideology and organisational network. It functioned, too, as an 'anti-system' party, and a 'tribune' party – roles now occupied by the two far-left parties, the Greens, and the National Front. In explaining the reasons for the declining fortunes of the PCF, Raymond invokes external change – class restructuring resulting from post-industrial society, the 'events' of 1968, the collapse of the Soviet empire, the constitution of the Vth Republic and 'the end of ideology', Raymond lays the blame for a failure to respond adequately to these changes at the door of the party's leadership – particularly that of Marchais, and cleaving to the old tablets of stone in a post-modern age.

Raymond argues that the PCF has ‘possibly’ a continued role to play, particularly since its ‘opening up’ by reforms started by Hue and continued by Buffet – though this means that the party must become something quite other than what it has been since 1920.

Readers will make up their own minds about the persuasiveness of some of the arguable assertions in the book, such as ‘the end of ideology’ (a notion some of us would see as an ideology in itself), the idea of a PCF ethno-culture, and the extent to which the party could have done anything about the changes that have taken place and remained a recognisable communist party. I have my doubts, but they should not deter anyone from reading what is an accessible and valuable contribution to the literature.

Jim Cordell
University of Salford

The Politics of the Irish Civil War

Bill Kissane

Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, xii + 264 pp., £45, ISBN 0-19-927355-3 (hbk)

This impressive and well-researched book considers ‘the three phases (the origins, the course, and the aftermath) of the Irish Civil War’ of 1922–23. It does so with more of an eye to ideology and politics than to military narrative and, as such, it provides a valuable complement to existing scholarship on the subject (especially Michael Hopkinson’s *Green Against Green*). Bill Kissane has already published one powerful study of early twentieth-century politics in Ireland; here, in *The Politics of the Irish Civil War*, he again combines the theoretical insights of political science with the archival detective-work of the historian. This is to be welcomed, as it allows for intelligent and detailed readings of important episodes such as the 1922–23 Irish conflict, and it enables the scholar to engage properly with comparative reflection. Kissane is aware of the importance of what was uniquely Irish about the personalities and context of the Irish Civil War, but he keeps a sharp eye also on the wider picture. So there is a very thoughtful chapter discussing self-determination as it featured (prominently, on both sides) in this early 1920s split within Irish nationalism, and the author’s argument here gains much from his knowledge of the theoretical literature on the subject.

The Civil War itself had some intriguing features. It represented a division between the more pragmatic and the more absolutist forces within Irish nationalism, as they differed in their response to the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty which effectively ended the 1919–21 War of Independence. But the Civil War’s combatants paid little attention to what was to become the most famous legacy of the early 1920s Irish settlement: the partition of Ireland into two states. As Kissane rightly notes, the most intense fighting in the Civil War occurred in the island’s south-west, ‘the region furthest removed from the northern border’: ‘In the course of the Treaty negotiations and after, the Sinn Fein elite had failed to make a priority of partition, or defend the interests of northern Catholics, who proved to be an indirect victim of the southern civil war.’

Kissane plausibly presents the 1921 Treaty itself as embodying ‘the triumph of pragmatism over dogma in Irish nationalist politics’ (part of a wider pattern in Irish nationalist history, in fact, despite frequent popular assumptions to the contrary). And he presents the more pragmatic pro-Treatyites as having won the historical argument: ‘The pro-treaty position was the more democratic one in 1922.’ Central questions during the war were those of governmental legitimacy and a commitment to non-military democracy – hence the importance, then as later, of the question of

republican decommissioning. As Kissane notes, the 'key issue' in the Civil War was 'how Irish republicanism could be reconciled to a democratic but 26-county state'.

The book is not without some slips (the Gaelic League was founded in 1893, not 1892 as stated here; 'Peadar O'Donnell' is spelt thus). And more might perhaps have been made of the rich memoir material from this very literary group of Irish nationalists. But the book remains an important, innovative and deeply scholarly contribution to our understanding of a crucial period in Irish history.

Richard English
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The Politics of Northern Ireland: Beyond the Belfast Agreement

Arthur Aughey

Routledge, London, 2005, 216 pp., £16.99, ISBN 0-4153-2788-1 (pbk), £60, ISBN 0-4153-2787-3 (hbk)

This is the latest in a long line of publications seeking to probe the reasons behind Northern Ireland's cold peace since the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) of April 1998 and, specifically, why the political institutions that followed have failed to become established effectively. Aughey seeks to illustrate how these institutions have been infected by political realities within a deeply divided society.

His central argument is that the GFA failed to fully appreciate (or reflect) the mutually exclusive expectations/demands and anxieties of the unionist and nationalist communities in Northern Ireland. Despite its ingenious drafting and the 'noble lie' reflected in its constructive ambiguity, the GFA was unable to clarify the central paradox at the heart of ethno-national politics in Northern Ireland, namely that unionists want to be British, nationalists want to be Irish and that a middle way between these objectives remains elusive. Aughey argues that the problems besetting the Northern Ireland peace process are not born of a failure of political imagination but, on the contrary, that the policy community has been over-imaginative to the point of being political fantasists, ignoring the reality that squares, by definition, cannot be circled.

Aughey presents his arguments in a typically combative manner, resorting regularly to continental philosophy to provide intellectual context. On some occasions this works well and adds depth to his analysis, though at times it is overdone. There is a limit to what Plato, Hegel or Schopenhauer can tell us about the political dynamics of ethno-national conflict in Northern Ireland and Aughey perhaps over-eggs his philosophical pudding in this regard.

This is a provocative and well argued book. Whether it is deemed to be a convincing one may depend upon the reader. Arranged in three parts ('Conditions', 'Modifications', 'Consequences'), the chapters examine the ideology, history, and political dynamics of the conflict, as well as the details/problems of the GFA itself. However, it is not an easy read and is a book for subject specialists rather than a more general academic audience.

Aughey's account contains detailed and often sharp observations on Northern Ireland's political dysfunction. However, his analysis at times veers towards the deterministic and non-unionist readers may feel that he places too much emphasis on the flawed architecture of the GFA as an excuse for failures of human agency and, in particular, wilful unionist wrecking tactics against the devolved institutions. The author treats the central fissures of the conflict as being immutable and unchanging, based on mutually exclusive ethno-national demands, with political 'solutions' inevitably conforming to zero-sum equations. While this might help the author to construct his critique against the GFA, this is too neat and too simplistic to take

account of the political complexities involved. It could be argued, for instance, that the difficulties experienced by the GFA owe less to its 'noble lie' or to the 'too-clever-by-half' nature of its drafters, than to good old fashioned unionist rejectionism.

Aughey does not reflect sufficiently upon the fact that unionist opposition to the GFA has not been driven by the mutually exclusive nature of nationalist/unionist politics at all, but by mistrust and fear among unionists about their political future in the absence of political violence. The GFA was not torpedoed by nationalists deciding to boycott structures of regional government within the UK, or by unionists objecting to power-sharing with an Irish dimension. It was brought down because neither side trusted the other to live up to the promises made in 1998 and because unionists in particular preferred the 'devil you know' of direct rule from Westminster to the insecurities associated with a power-sharing administration that included Sinn Fein. While the GFA was culpable in this downfall by failing to provide sufficient mechanisms to reduce sectarianism, the fundamental cause, it could be argued, was a lack of political will within the unionist community and others with an interest in the political failure of the GFA. The structures of government finally collapsed in October 2002 following an alleged IRA spy-ring in Stormont and the arrest of a senior Sinn Fein figure who, it later transpired, had been a British agent for over 20 years (i.e. elements within the British security services triggered the collapse of the GFA by arresting their own spy and blaming it on the IRA). While Aughey skilfully outlines the political flaws in the GFA, he underplays the role of human agency in its failure and gives insufficient attention to the fact that the gulf between the rival demands of unionism and nationalism has narrowed considerably since the peace process began, making positive-sum outcomes possible.

Nevertheless, while Aughey's analysis will not be to everyone's taste, this is a stimulating book for specialists in the area and a useful addition to the literature on Irish politics.

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Racist Extremism in Central and Eastern Europe

Cas Mudde (Ed.)

Routledge, London, 2005, 332 pp., £19.99, ISBN 0-4153-5594-X (pbk), £70, ISBN 0-4153-5593-1 (hbk)

Given the legacy of twentieth century western Europe, it is not surprising that political scientists and policymakers continue to devote considerable intellectual energy to understanding extremism and xenophobia. The causes, consequences and kinds of racist extremism are intimately linked with the quality of democracy in the region, but scholars have clearly assembled and dissected less knowledge about such phenomena in post-communist Europe than they have in the west. To remedy this deficiency, the present edited volume unashamedly seeks to avoid 'taking an overly academic approach' and instead opts for a 'human rights and anti-racism perspective' in order to compare developments in ten new and future EU member states (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia). A project begun by Nils Muižnieks but concluded by Cas Mudde (following Muižnieks' selection as Latvia's Minister for Social Integration), this book brings together 15 contributors primarily from rights-based institutes and foundations in central and eastern Europe. The result is a work that, although more descriptive than analytical, achieves its original goal of providing timely and telling country reports.

One of the book's strengths is that the contributors successfully follow a common template. The common approach entails a mapping of extremist groups, including data on the number of extremist groups, the size of their membership bases, their sociological profiles, programmatic goals, status, media outlets and ties to other groups both within and outside the country. Each country report likewise contains details of the legal rights of minorities, ratification status of relevant international agreements protecting civil and political rights, and laws directed at prohibiting racially motivated violence. Attention is devoted to the existence and strength of institutions responsible for the protection of minorities, including Russians. Finally, many of the respective chapters reference efforts by the EU (or the lack thereof) to direct attention and action to minority rights, racially motivated violence, and racial discrimination. An excellent appendix provides detailed country information on acceptance of principal international (e.g. United Nations) and European (e.g. Council of Europe) instruments relevant to combating xenophobia and intolerance. Each of these country reports produces nuggets of discovery that may be of use to academic observers, advocates, and even policymakers. Christo Ivanov and Margarita Ilieva, for example, find that the EU accession process 'crucial for minority protection, has had no bearing on racist extremism' in Bulgaria. Writing on Lithuania, Giedrius Kiaulakis concludes that politicians and mass media in that country 'use the people's xenophobic feelings to increase their popularity, and do not consider such actions to be unethical'. On Poland Rafal Pankowski and Marcin Kornak describe development of a youth-oriented anti-racist movement as 'an encouraging sign'. The book's additional highlight is a synthetic concluding chapter by Cas Mudde, which offers comparison of the situation of racist extremism in central and eastern Europe with that in western Europe. Mudde's essential finding is that the differences between the regions are 'less striking' than is often assumed.

Political scientists looking for hypothesis-driven theory building will be disappointed by this book, but those seeking an empirical foundation for evaluating extremist challenges to democracy will find significant merit in the effort. The collection of country reports constitutes an important baseline against which future attempts to combat racist discrimination can be assessed.

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The Politics of European Union Enlargement: Theoretical Approaches

Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (Eds)

Routledge, London, 2005, xvi + 299 pp., £70, ISBN 0-415-36129-X (hbk)

Constructing the Path to Eastern Enlargement: The Uneven Impact of EU Identity

Ulrich Sedelmeier

Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2005, xii + 220 pp., £55, ISBN 0-7190-7008-2 (hbk)

In recent years, a growing group of scholars have begun to treat EU enlargement as a topic that not only *can* but also *should* be examined in a broader theoretical and empirical framework. This development may be seen as part of a growing trend in political research to see EU studies not exclusively as an isolated field of inquiry but rather as a study domain from which it is possible and necessary to generalise findings to other literatures. In the wake of this trend that one can observe that a growing number of authors whose interests are mainly in the fundamental theories of international relations have now endorsed EU enlargement as an important empirical test case.

The Politics of European Union Enlargement is clearly one of those books that are aimed at taking stock of these growing empirical and theoretical ambitions. As such it certainly represents a laudable mission, not in the least because there has been in recent years an avalanche of books and articles on the 'new' Europe. It was certainly high time for a book that identifies the most important novel trends in the study of how this new Europe came about. But is this book indeed the key reference text the cover claims it to be?

The answer to that question will depend on what you expect from a key reference text. One should not expect a systematic overview of *all* aspects of the latest EU enlargement to Central Europe. Neither is this book, as one could maybe expect, a systematic guide to the enlargement from the perspective of the existing theories of European integration; it is for that purpose too strongly related to a particular and open-ended meta-theoretical debate in international relations. Nevertheless, one soon discovers that there is indeed much to learn from this volume, both with regard to the EU enlargement in empirical terms and with regard to theories of international relations. In fact, the book is instructive precisely because it reflects a number of broader academic debates and developments.

The book mirrors a recent development towards the study of the EU as a political organisation that can be studied from the perspective of international relations as well as from the viewpoint of comparative politics, utilising especially approaches drawn from institutional analysis. The Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier volume is an exponent of this convergence because it adopts an empirical scope that facilitates the use of a combination of comparative politics and international relations tools in the analysis. At the basis of this enterprise lies a very useful definition of EU enlargement as a broad field of politics. The editors do not think about enlargement in any formal sense. They seek to widen the focus to a broad field of horizontal institutionalisation processes. This conceptualisation places the book squarely into both an international relations and a comparative study framework. Within this well-defined framework changes in the EU as well as changes in the applicant countries and in the member states are discussed. The book does not isolate the case of the EU from other international organisations, and thus it allows for the making of explicit comparisons with enlargement processes in NATO and the Council of Europe. Moreover, the volume offers chapters analysing the EU's motivation to enlarge and chapters examining the motivation of the candidates to join. And it includes chapters that offer longitudinal comparisons across enlargement rounds, all offering interesting data and analyses.

This volume also reflects a development in an important meta-theoretical debate in international relations, the debate between rationalism and constructivism. In their introduction, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier ostensibly only want to make a modest claim about it and argue that the rationalist/constructivist debate is nothing more than 'a useful way to structure and organise' the major tendencies and controversies in the EU enlargement literature. This argument, however, reveals only part of what is happening in the book. By choosing to position the study of EU enlargement in this particular meta-theoretical discussion the editors clearly do want to make an important claim about this debate. In fact, the book is representative of a current trend that seeks to bring together instead of further dividing constructivist and rationalist thinkers in EU studies.

One need not even be familiar with the details of the debate between rationalists and constructivists in order to see that in this volume, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, whose work could be labelled constructivist, have sought to take the debate a step further. Is enlargement the result of strategic, interest-driven behaviour, or is it about the incorporation of norms and the growth of collective identification with certain ideas about the need for enlargement? It can be

both, they argue. Authors who are convinced of the need to apply constructivist perspectives should be prepared to admit that – as Sedelmeier writes in his chapter – ‘material self-interests and strategic bargaining are an important part of the process’ (p. 126). At the same time, rationalist thinkers are invited by constructivists to accept that norms have a strong effect on behaviour. To a certain extent, rationalists are indeed prepared to do that. Andrew Moravcsik and Milada Vachudova, for example, are lenient enough to write in their chapter that there is ‘no doubt that a measure of idealism played a supporting role in the decision to enlarge’ (p. 204).

But how should we imagine an analysis that takes both material interests and constitutive ideas seriously? There are various chapters in this book that offer useful examples of how an empirical analysis can make use of a combination of constructivist and rationalist-styled arguments and concepts to explain the EU enlargement. Schimmelfennig’s chapter on ‘rhetorical action’ – the strategic use of norm-based arguments in the pursuit of self-interest – is an interesting illustration. Schimmelfennig argues that because of the dominant rhetoric among EU members about the ideology of a pan-European community of liberal democracies, the opponents of enlargement could not openly oppose or threaten to veto enlargement without damaging their credibility as community members. They found themselves thus ‘rhetorically entrapped’. In large part, Schimmelfennig’s argument does not go against the rationalist explanation. The decision to open accession negotiations with the Central European candidates can and must be explained from a rationalist perspective, he argues. But we need input from constructivist thinking in order to explain the fact that the enlargement in the end was not blocked. Examining the rhetorical mechanisms and analysing how they produced their own dynamics and created a logic from which it became difficult to escape is, according to Schimmelfennig, a good way forward.

Sedelmeier adopts a set of theoretical propositions that are to a large extent compatible with what Schimmelfennig argues about the mechanism of rhetorical action. Sedelmeier elaborates his arguments not only in a chapter in the edited volume, but also in a separate book in which he carefully documents both the decision to enlarge and the way in which enlargement policy took shape on the level of the sectoral policy-makers. Without arguing that policy-makers automatically become full believers of the norms that they put forward for strategic reasons, Sedelmeier suggests that the discursively constructed role of the EU towards Central Europe indeed had an important impact, albeit an uneven one, on the outcome of the enlargement process. On the macro-policy level, he argues that the construction of an EU identity involving a ‘special responsibility’ of the EU members towards Central Europe limited opposition and confined policy options to a path to enlargement. On the level of the sectoral policies, Sedelmeier’s analysis convincingly suggests that policy outcomes on this level are significantly influenced by ‘policy paradigms’, which he defines as sets of ideas underpinning EU policy in particular areas. The more compatible the policy paradigms are with the preferences of the applicants, the more likely it is that the policy advocates in the applicant countries can build alliances with sectoral policy-makers, even in the face of strong interest group opposition.

Some readers may have difficulty with the way Sedelmeier invokes ‘EU identity’ as an explanatory variable. Sedelmeier defines it as ‘a specific role’ that was first discursively constructed by policy-makers and subsequently confined the options for those policy-makers to an accommodation of the preferences of applicant countries in Central Europe. But one could wonder whether it was a good choice to rely on the notion of ‘identity’. Is identity automatically important and influential? The notion might obscure the question of why and how it becomes important and

influential. Applying this term might create the impression that mechanisms that have led to the construction of the power of roles played by the advocates of enlargement are taken out of the analysis, which is not the case. But on the whole Sedelmeier makes his argument systematically and eloquently.

It is important to note that Sedelmeier's analysis does not go entirely against rationalist explanations of European integration. He submits that there were common long-term interests among the member states to enlarge, such as the prospect of political stability and economic opportunities in the eastern part of Europe. He is also prepared to give credit to rationalist approaches for correctly identifying material interests as crucial factors constraining the accommodation of the preferences of the Central European countries. But rationalist explanations are, according to Sedelmeier, less convincing when it comes to explaining why, after the conclusion of the Europe agreements, EU policy evolved into what increasingly became an irreversible path to enlargement and shifted towards greater accommodation of the demands of the Central European candidate countries.

How should we assess these attempts to build a bridge between constructivist and rationalist accounts of EU enlargement? If one takes rationalism and constructivism as fundamentally and ontologically different views of how the social world works, then the attempt to bring them together in the field of EU studies is bound to be a difficult project. Neither constructivists nor rationalists can give a final answer to the question whether policy change is indeed caused mainly by ideas or mainly by interests. When less grand aims are at stake, however, there is more space for common ground. That common ground is basically the terrain of sophisticated empirical research in which both rationalist and constructivist-styled tools can be used to try to make sense of certain outcomes. While a rationalist theory of enlargement may then be seen as important in explaining certain aspects of the enlargement, effects of social factors and 'constitutive' ideas may be used to explain other parts of the process. Of course, on this field too there will still be a lot of room for debate. The criticisms by Moravcsik and Vachudova, noted above, are a case in point. In order to be prepared even to begin to go along with a constructivist account of the EU enlargement, one has to accept that there are indeed certain developments in the enlargement process that cannot be fully explained from a rationalist perspective and need additional clarification. Moravcsik and Vachudova question that basic argument.

The writings of Sedelmeier and Schimmelfennig signal the willingness among a growing group of scholars to engage in a dialogue between constructivism and rationalism in the study of EU enlargement. The importance of this achievement should not be underestimated. But one should perhaps also hope now that theorising about EU enlargement will not become *merely* a battleground for those who aim to gauge, divide or bring together fundamental theories of international relations. For this reason it is good to see that the Sedelmeier and Schimmelfennig volume includes an author who wisely warns that the choice to position this debate in this meta-theoretical framework might create its own blind spots. Markus Jachtenfuchs in one of the closing essays of the volume argues that a problem-oriented approach is not less valuable than a theory-oriented or a meta-theory-oriented approach. Instead of seeking to design idea-oriented or interest-oriented explanations, the important task ahead is to gain a better empirical understanding of how ideas and interests interact. This volume could signal the fact that EU enlargement studies are indeed ready for this task.

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Europe and the Recognition of New States in Yugoslavia

Richard Caplan

Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, ix + 229 pp., £45, ISBN 0-521-82176-2 (hbk)

The European Community/Union's role in the Western Balkans in the 1990s is usually portrayed as inglorious. Many accounts of Yugoslavia's demise argue that the EC/EU vacillated, dithered and then intervened ineptly as politicians and generals motivated by nationalism, power and/or malice carved up the federal state with devastating and bloody consequences. If this was the 'Hour of Europe' as Jacques Poos, Luxembourg's then Foreign Minister, proclaimed in June 1991, then perhaps it might have been better if the clocks had been stopped at one minute to midnight.

In his well-researched and thought-provoking book Richard Caplan shines a spotlight on one of the most contentious aspects of the EC's policy towards the former Yugoslavia: the recognition of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Critics of the EC see the decision to recognise the republics as new states as responsible for scuppering the Carrington and Vance Peace Plans and for engulfing Bosnia-Herzegovina in death and destruction.

Caplan argues persuasively that the negative impact of the EC's recognition has been 'greatly overstated' (p. 144). For Caplan the prospect of recognition played no significant role in Croatia's and Slovenia's determination to initiate and pursue their campaigns for independence. Indeed, his monograph strengthens the argument that the key to understanding the death of Yugoslavia lies in domestic politics, especially the 'measures adopted by the republic governments in reaction to adverse political trends in Serbia and at the federal level' (p. 97). Slovene and Croatian politicians knew in June 1991 that the EC was not going to offer any formal support for their declarations of independence. As Slovenia's erstwhile Defence Minister Janez Janša put it, the Slovenes and Croats would have to rely only on their 'determination, wits and bravery' (p. 100). Fearful of the consequences of dissolution, EC leaders hoped that the federal state would remain intact, but thanks in part to Belgrade's use of force and its disregard for the niceties of human rights and the rule of law, opinion within the EC swung towards granting recognition to the new states.

Moreover, argues Caplan, in Bosnia-Herzegovina 'it is doubtful that non-recognition would have prevented the eruption of generalised violence since Bosnian Serb aspirations for an ethnically homogenous state entity could not be realized without resort to violence' (p. 144). Although, the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina was the trigger for Bosnian Serb gunmen to start opening fire in earnest on Sarajevo, basing his account in part on Yugoslav National Army documents suggesting a siege was already being planned in September 1991 and the fact that smaller-scale attacks on the Bosnian capital occurred before the EC's recognition on 7 April 1992, Caplan believes the Bosnian war would have broken out anyway. The EC's recognition policy certainly helped 'facilitate' Bosnia's moves towards independence, but much here probably hinges on the plans of the leaders of Bosnia such as Alija Izetbegović, whose thinking, Caplan concedes, was 'anything but consistent' (p. 124).

A few criticisms deserve to be levelled at the book. Caplan is keen for his monograph to feed into many fields of study, but this means that the book at times lacks focus. The discussion of international law in chapter two, for example, could have been truncated or at least reshaped to fit in more closely with the strategic logic and consequences of the EC's actions. Equally, given the central theme of recognition, the first half of chapter five, which discusses the role of political conditionality, could have been condensed. Moreover, the general reader would benefit from more detailed maps to help navigation, especially when the author goes

into detail on the Serbian Autonomous Regions. Nonetheless, it would be churlish to dwell too much on these criticisms, Richard Caplan has produced a highly praiseworthy book which should be read by all interested in the Yugoslav conflict and the EC/EU's role in the Western Balkans.

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Partisan Interventions: European Party Politics and Peace Enforcement in the Balkans

Brian C. Rathbun

Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 2005, 228 pp., £22.95, ISBN 0-8014-4255-9 (hbk)

This is a timely study of the role partisan politics plays in foreign affairs. It examines the consequences of political party ideologies for their understanding of the national interest by focusing on the ways Britain, Germany and France responded to the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s and to the creation of the EU's capacity for conducting peace enforcement operations. The book is based on extensive research in primary sources, including party platforms, government statements and parliamentary debates, as well as interviews with a variety of senior party and government officials, not least former foreign and defence ministers, diplomats and heads of armed forces.

Rathbun argues that the values parties stand for in domestic politics are also largely the values that shape their foreign policy. The left's concern with equality is expressed in an inclusive foreign policy, or the promotion of human rights and liberal values abroad, greater multilateralism and antimilitarism. While peace enforcement compels all leftist parties to choose between the promotion of human rights and their antimilitarism, the strength of leftist interventionists and antimilitarists in each country depends principally on whether or not coercive foreign policy means are seen to have in the past helped realise inclusive goals. Therefore, while the left in Britain and France was committed early on to the promotion of domestic values abroad in the former Yugoslavia, and to support the EU defence cooperation, the German left only gradually overcame its strong antimilitarist stance. France's caution over the intervention in Bosnia was principally due to Mitterand's personal stance and presidential prerogatives that restricted the influence of parties in the policy-making process. By contrast, rightist parties, with a more exclusive conception of the national interest, are less inclined to engage in peace enforcement unless the interventions present an opportunity to pursue other ideological goals. The German right thus made use of the intervention in Bosnia to 'normalise' the use of force in Germany's foreign policy, while the French rightist parties instrumentalised the interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo to boost France's international standing.

Students of international relations will find the argument about the role of partisan politics in defining the national interest particularly useful because it addresses drawbacks of the prevailing culturalist and realist approaches in the field. A few small factual errors regarding the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo do not spoil the reading, nor does a rather loose labelling of France's system as presidential, instead of semi-presidential or premier-presidential. However, the subtitle is somewhat misleading since the book focuses on the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, rather than the Balkans as a whole. Overall, this is a well-designed and well-researched book on an important topic and is recommended to readers.

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Kosovo: The Politics of Identity and Space

Denisa Kostovicova

Routledge, London, 2005, 344 pp., £75, ISBN 0-4153-4806-4

The book deals with the role of education in nation-building in general and in the case of Kosovo Albanians in particular.

Although the study is based on an impressive account of the empirical situation as well as provides a comprehensive theoretical bibliography, this book lacks, apart from an ambition to provide for conceptual clarity, a 'dialectics of enlightenment' (Adorno and Horkheimer) approach towards the issue at hand. As education plays an 'awakening role', it can also serve as an ideology. Modern nationalism is fundamentally based on a democratised educational system. The Albanian educational system, both the official system, which includes the University of Prishtina, and the parallel one, was both nation-building and state-destroying. Kostovicova neglects the latter point.

It is of course the case that Milosevic's Serbian regime, as well as Serbian nationalism as such, are responsible and guilty for the tragedy of Kosovo. However, any account of the role of education in Kosovo should have more critically engaged with Albanian state-destroying nationalism, in particular its contribution to the destruction of Yugoslavia. The state of Yugoslavia was far from perfect, especially with regard to minority issues, but it was, after all, ruled for a while by a representative from a minority group – who was Albanian.

Kostovicova argues that the main reason for the Albanian national revolt is the 'brotherhood and unity' component of the previous communist educational system. The author here relies on the widely used (and simplistic) explanation for the eruption of nationalisms in Eastern Europe: the fall of communism revealed suppressed ethnic identities and rivalries. This account is in my view not applicable to the former Yugoslavia. Kostovicova should have sought to probe this explanation further rather than resorting to immediate and arguably superficial explanations.

The book provides a satisfactory account of Kosovo Albanians' nation-building for those who expect to see it in a romantic light. Their parallel educational system appears to be one of the most striking national awakenings in the history of European nationalism. And yet, one gets the impression that this study builds on another also widely accepted Eurocentric stereotype: the division between two different models of nationalism – one Western, and thus civic – and one non-Western (including East European), and therefore ethnic nationalism.

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The Politics of Regional Identity: Meddling with the Mediterranean

Michelle Pace

Routledge, London, 2006, 264 pp., £65, ISBN 0-4153-3396-2 (hbk)

With the launch of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) in 1995, the European Union has increasingly sought to institutionalise and clarify its long-standing relationship with countries in the Mediterranean. Michelle Pace's book is an exploration of the identity constructions that inform this broader EU–Mediterranean relationship. She asks how the space of 'the Mediterranean' is conceptualised and defined by differently situated actors. In doing so, she attempts to identify the underlying power dynamics that structure the relationship, and to explore the various strands of meaning that have been attached to the Mediterranean.

The overall focus of the book is how the Mediterranean, as a region, is discursively constructed and constituted. In the process of discursive construction, Pace argues, the Mediterranean comes to be viewed in opposition to Europe. Thus, the process of analysing EU discourse on the Mediterranean also reveals how Europe is constructing its own identity. The Mediterranean that emerges in Pace's discussion of official EU documents is a zone that is securitised, underdeveloped, and unstable – a source of illegal immigration and/or terrorism. It is thus understandable that Pace finds that Mediterranean states' own interpretations of their regional identity are more ambiguous. Pace presents data collected in three states – Malta, Greece and Morocco. Her major finding is that regional identifications in these states are much more complex than the EU discourse allows for. In each case, national identifications appear to trump regional identifications. Of the three states, Morocco is the one which most identifies with the Mediterranean concept – as it provides a means of distinguishing itself variously from other Arab, African or majority-Muslim states.

The book will no doubt be of value to scholars interested in European–Mediterranean relations. It also speaks to broader debates in International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis by setting forth an approach identified as 'discursive constructivism'. Perhaps because of Pace's various agendas, however, the book often lacks focus. It would have benefited from better editing (there are paragraphs in the book that literally run on for pages). And, despite the lengthy discussion of theory and methodology in the first two chapters, the empirical section of the book consists mainly of background information (the 'doxic backdrop' – p. 122) and impressions drawn from largely unspecified interviews. Moreover, for a book claiming to examine regional identity, the narrow focus on Malta, Greece and Morocco is somewhat odd. Greece and Malta are both EU member states, and the relative lack of information and discussion on states such as Turkey, Cyprus or Algeria leaves one wondering, with the author, what it is that ultimately defines the Mediterranean.

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